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1. INTRODUCTION
The International Centre for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID)l was created at a time when most African
countries had just gained independence and foreign investment
required a more legitimate2 protection in the former colonies.3 The
ICSID Convention,4 which set up the Centre, came into force on
1 Comprehensive information on the history, structure, and operations of
ICSID is available on the official website at www.worldbank.org/icsid.
2 See, e.g., Louis T. Wells, Preface to THE EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
REGIME: EXPECTATIONS, REALITIES, OPTIONS xv, xvi (os6 E. Alvarez & Karl P.
Sauvant eds., 2011) ("In the rather distant past, the United States and other rich
countries would occasionally act militarily or insist on state-state arbitrations
when their investors claimed mistreatment abroad. Later, the United States
would threaten (and occasionally act) to cut off aid, vote against loans by
multilateral financial institutions to offending countries, and cancel trade
preferences . . . .").
3 Professor Lowenfeld writes:
By the early 1960s, following the wave of decolonization in Africa and
parts of Asia, and a wave of take-overs of foreign investments
throughout the Third World, it had become apparent that it would be
very difficult to achieve consensus on the obligations of host countries
toward alien investment (read multinational corporations). The leading
international aid institution, the World Bank, began to consider how, on
the one hand, it could avoid becoming embroiled in controversies
between home and host states concerning expropriation, and on the
other hand, how it could assist the resolution of such controversies ....
ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL EcoNOMIc LAw 536-37 (2d ed. 2008). See
also Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Emerging Global Regime for Investment, 51 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 427, 436-37 (2010) ("[Tihe existing international law at the end of World War
II-what one might call the 'ancien rigime'-failed to adequately protect the
foreign investments of their [capital-exporting] nationals from injurious actions by
host country governments . . . . The need for such protection was heightened by
the prospect of post-War economic expansion and the decolonization of territories
that had previously been under the control of capital-exporting states.").
4 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States, Oct. 14, 1966, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, available
at www.worldbank.org/icsid [hereinafter ICSID Convention]. For a
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October 14, 1966, when the twentieth instrument of ratification was
deposited with the Secretariat of the United Nations.5
Significantly, fifteen of the original deposits of the ratification
instruments came from African states. 6 Naturally, the very first
respondent state in ICSID proceedings was also an African state.7
Examination of the history of the ICSID Convention suggests
that the African states' instantaneous and overwhelming
acceptance of ICSID was solely propelled by the perception that
doing so would increase the flow of badly needed foreign direct
investment (FDI) from the West into the newly independent
continent,8 although the Convention itself makes no such express
comprehensive article-by-article commentary of the Convention, see Christoph H.
Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (2d ed. 2009).
5 See List of Contracting States and Other Signatories of the Convention (as of
November 1, 2013), INT'L CTR. FOR SETILEMENT OF INV. DisP. (Nov. 1, 2013),
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&acti
onVal=ShowDocument&language=English (listing 158 States that have signed the
Convention and 150 States that have deposited their instruments of ratification).
6 Id. The fifteen original African contracting states were: Benin, Burkina
Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, C6te d'Ivoire, Gabon,
Ghana, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Tunisia, and
Uganda. A total of twenty instruments of ratification were deposited that day.
The remaining six came from Iceland, Jamaica, Malaysia, Netherlands, and the
United States. Id.
7 Holiday Inns S.A. & Others v. Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/72/1 (1972).
For a list of all concluded ICSID cases, see List of Concluded Cases, INT'L CTR. FOR
SETILEMENT INv. DisP.,
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=GenCaseDtsRH&
actionVal=ListConcluded (last visited April 2, 2014).
8 The statements of the representative of Sierra Leone during the African
legal consultative meeting that occurred in Addis Ababa in 1963 (which is
discussed more fully infra section 2.2 summarizes the general understanding very
well: "[i]t would be easier for the developing countries to obtain the investments
they needed if all agreements contained a clause to the effect that disputes could
be referred to the Center [ICSID]." INT'L CTR. FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT
DISPUTEs [ICSID], 2 HISTORY OF THE CONVENTION: DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE
ORIGIN AND FORMULATION OF THE CONVENTION 236, 255 (1968) [hereinafter History
of ICSID]. For a discussion of this history, see infra section 2.2. Studies have since
questioned this proposition. See, e.g., THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT: BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES, and
Investment Flows (Karl P. Sauvant & Lisa E. Sachs eds., 2009) (questioning the
impact of BITs on foreign direct investment flows); Jeswald W. Salacuse &
Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?: An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment
Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT'L L.J. 67, 90 (2005) ("[I]nvestors ...
that are covered by a BIT certainly enjoy a higher degree of protection from the
political risks of governmental intervention. . . .").
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promise. 9 Structurally, however, ICSID's close affiliations with the
World Bank never sat very comfortably with the Africans from the
very beginning. The history is full of examples of expressions of
misgivings about the establishment of a dispute settlement
mechanism under the auspices of Africa's principal financier.'0
While the history of Africa's relations with the Bank itself has
been a troubled one," it is remarkable that over the last half-
century, many African states voluntarily submitted to the
jurisdiction of ICSID tribunals and answered charges of
expropriation and other alleged violations of the rights of private
investors in Washington, D.C. and various European fora. Indeed,
since its inception, more than twenty percent of all ICSID cases
involved African states as respondents, with sixteen percent
involving Sub-Saharan states.12 Interestingly, however, so far, only
two percent of the arbitrators and conciliators have been from Sub-
Saharan Africa.'3  Approximately seventy percent of all the
9 ICSID Convention, supra note 4, at pmbl. It appears to have been carefully
drafted to avoid exactly that implication. It reads in relevant part: "Considering
the need for international cooperation for economic development, and the role of
private international investment therein; Bearing in mind the possibility that from
time to time disputes may arise in connection with such investment between
Contracting States and nationals of other Contracting States." Id.
10 AMAZU A. Asouzu, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND AFRICAN
STATES: PRACTICE, PARTICIPATION AND INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 224-25 (2001)
(summarizing the discussions indicating the African states' concerns about the
affiliation of the Center with the World Bank, including concerns about the
merger of the positions of the Bank's presidency with the chair of the
Administrative Council of the Center).
11 See, e.g., Celia W. Dugger, World Bank Neglects African Farming, Study Says,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/15/world/africa/
15worldbank.html ("Professor Sachs called the evaluation 'a blistering,
devastating critique.' Professor Easterly, a research economist at the bank for
more than a decade, likened the evaluation to saying Coca-Cola is bad at making
its signature soft drink. 'Here's your most important client, Africa, with its most
important sector, agriculture, relevant to the most important goal -people feeding
their families-and the bank has been caught with two decades of neglect,' he
said.").
12 ICSID, THE ICSID CASELOAD -STATISTICS 11 (2012), available at
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&acti
onVal=ShowDocument&CaseLoadStatistics=True&language=English31
[hereinafter ICSID 2012 STATISTICS]. These latest ICSID statistics shows that
sixteen percent of all ICSID cases were from Sub-Saharan Africa while ten percent
were from the Middle East and North Africa. ICSID follows the World Bank's
regional classification and merges North African States with the Middle East.
Because many of the North African States have had cases before ICSID, the
percentage of African States is clearly more than twenty percent. Id.
13 Id. at 16.
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arbitrators, conciliators, and ad hoc committee members have been
Western Europeans or North Americans.14 Significantly, forty-
seven percent of all arbitrators and conciliators have been Western
Europeans15 while the number of Western European states that
were ever called upon to answer charges before ICSID tribunals in
Washington or elsewhere was limited to a mere one percent.16
Even more remarkably, less than five percent of all arbitrators,
conciliators, and ad hoc committee members have been women.17
Today, Africa's largest infrastructure financier is no longer the
World Bank-it is China. Indeed, it was back in 2005 that the
volume of China's investment in African infrastructure surpassed
that of the World Bank's. 18 In the decade of 2000, trade between
Africa and China alone grew substantially.19 According to a recent
UNCTAD report, the share of Asian Foreign Direct Investment
inflows to Africa rose from 6.7% for the period 1995-1999, to 15.2%
for the period 2000-2008.20 Now, a network of at least thirty-five
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) purportedly protects China's
enormous investment in Africa.21 The treaties signed after China's
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 11.
17 Michael Waibel & Yanhui Wu, Are Arbitrators Political? 27 & tbl.2 (Nov. 5,
2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.wipol.uni-bonn.de/
lehrveranstaltungen-1/lawecon-workshop/archive/dateien/waibelwinterll-12
[hereinafter Waibel & Wu Study] (conducting an empirical study based on ICSID
database review).
18 CHARLES ROXBURGH ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., LIONS ON THE MOVE:
THE PROGRESS AND POTENTIAL OF AFRICAN ECONOMIES 15-16 (2010), available at
http://www.mckinsey.com/-/media/McKinsey/dotcom/Insights and
pubs/MGI/Research/Productivity Competitiveness and Growth/Lions on the
move The progress of African economies/MGI Lions on the move african_
economies full report.ashx. The report cites Chinese investment of $23 billion for
the development of Nigerian refinery Capacity and $5-8 billion investment in
Liberia and Guinea for railroads, ports and mines as examples. Id. Chinese
investments are also replacing some of Africa's traditional business partners. Id.
19 AFRICAN CTR. FOR ECON. TRANSFORMATION (ACET), LOOKING EAST: A POLICY
BRIEF ON ENGAGING CHINA FOR AFRICAN POLICY-MAKERS 4, 5, 11 (2009), available at
http://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/uploads/files/2506a097-7a04-4dal-9af8-
4423debecl7e-lookingeastvl.pdf.
20 U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEv. (UNCTAD), ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
IN AFRICA REPORT 2010: SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION AND THE NEW FORMS OF
DEVELOPMENT PARTNERSHIP, at 84, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ALDC/AFRICA/2010,
U.N. Sales No. E.10.II.D.13 (2010), available at http://unctad.org/en/Docs/
aldcafrica2010_en.pdf.
21 Norah Gallagher & Wenhua Shan, Chinese Investment Treaties: Policies
and Practice 39-40 (2009).
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accession to ICSID in 1993 provide for open access to ICSID
arbitration.22 However, China does not have as much experience
with ICSID as Africa, although it has shown interest in pursuing
investment arbitration in recent years as it assumes a greater role
as an exporter of capital and seeks to protect its rapidly growing
investments abroad.23  Nonetheless, as this article will
demonstrate, at its very core, ICSID was never designed for, nor
has it ever meaningfully served, South-South disputes-which
China-Africa disputes technically are. In light of this background,
this article weighs in on the debate over ICSID's legitimacy from
the perspective of Africa's experience in the last half-century and
evaluates ICSID's suitability to resolve current and future
investment disputes that arise out of the new economic
partnerships between African states and Chinese investors.
The article is divided into five parts. Part 2 examines the
various narratives on ICSID's legitimacy and critically appraises
the existing empirical studies in light of Africa's experience. Part 3
discusses Africa's position on the fundamental doctrinal dilemma
in foreign investment law vis-A-vis the new China factor. Part 4
provides a case study of selected ICSID cases involving African
states to put the empirical studies in context and shed some light
on the nature of justice that the tribunals have dispensed. Part 5
provides a more focused assessment of ICSID's suitability for the
resolution of disputes between African states and Chinese
investors. Part 6 concludes the article.
2. THE ICSID LEGITIMACY DEBATE AND THE EMERGING EMPIRICAL
JUSTIFICATION
A provocative and oft-cited New York Times article once touted:
"Their meetings are secret. Their members are generally unknown.
22 See id. at 38 (discussing the reduction of Chinese skepticism towards using
ICSID to arbitrate international investment disputes and China's ultimate signing
and ratification of the ICSID Convention). The BITs that China signed after its
accession to the ICSID Convention in 1993 are with: South Africa (1997),
Congo(DR) (2000), Botswana (2000), Sierra Leone (2001), Mozambique (2001),
Kenya (2001), Nigeria (2001), Conte d'Ivoire (2002), Djibouti (2003), Benin (2004),
Uganda (2004), Tunisia (2004), Seychelles (2007). Id. at 42 tbl.1.2.
23 Chinese companies have begun using ICSID as an arbitral forum in recent
times. See, e.g., Ping An Life Ins. Co. of China, Ltd. & Ping An Ins. (Grp.) Co. of
China, Ltd. v. Kingdom of Belg., ICSID Case No. ARB/12/29 (2013); Tza Yap
Shum v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6 (2007) (serving as examples
of Chinese companies availing themselves of ICSID).
564 [Vol. 35:3
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The decisions they reach need not be fully disclosed. Yet the way a
small number of international tribunals handles disputes between
investors and foreign governments has led to national laws being
revoked, justice systems questioned and environmental regulations
challenged." 24 Interestingly, this was said in relation to the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) investment
arbitration. 25 If these perceived intricacies affect the United States
and Canada so greatly, how do the African states appearing before
these tribunals fare? Opinions on ICSID arbitration range from
harsh allegations of neo-liberal attempts to bankrupt developing
countrieS26 to more nuanced statements of misgivingS27 to the
expression of confidence that ICSID is a fair and equitable forum. 28
The fact that ICSID tribunals have always suffered from a
serious lack of diversity is not a subject of dispute, as it could
clearly be seen from ICSID's publicly available arbitrator-
nationality pie-chart, which needs no interpretation.29
Interestingly, however, mainstream scholarly discourses have
largely ignored how this deficit impacts arbitration outcomes;
instead, scholars frame the issue, at a more general level, as
contributing to coherency of the jurisprudence produced and
24 Anthony DePalma, Nafta's Powerful Little Secret; Obscure Tribunals Settle




26 See, e.g., NICK BUXTON, TRANSNAT'L INST. & CORP. EUR. OBSERVATORY,
LEGALIZED PROFITEERING? How CORPORATE LAWYERS ARE FUELLING AN INVESTMENT
BooM 1, 4-6 (2011), available at http://www.sierraclub.ca/en/main-page/
legalized-profiteering-how-corporate-lawyers-are-fuelling-investment-arbitration-
boom (describing the injustice created by the arbitration system in forcing
developing and economically crippled countries to defendant themselves at great
cost and with a substantial likelihood of losing a judgment equal to a substantial
percentage of their national budget); Cecilia Olivet, The Dark Side of Investment
Agreements, TRANSNAT'L INST., Dec. 2011, at 1, 4, available at http://www.tni.org
/sites/www.tni.org/files/the dark sideofinvestment treaties-final.pdf
(discussing the adverse affects international investment arbitrations have on
developing countries due to the rules favoring transnational corporations).
27 See generally R. Rajesh Babu, International Commercial Arbitration and the
Developing Countries 4 ASIAN-AFRICAN CONSULTATIVE ORG. Q. BULL. 385 (2006)
(discussing arguments against ICSID and international investment arbitration
based on the adverse consequences for developing countries).
28 Susan D. Franck, Development and Outcomes of Investment Treaty Arbitration,
50 HARV. INT'L L.J. 435 (2009) [hereinafter Franck Study].
29 ICSID 2012 STATISTICS, supra note 12, at 16. See the pie-chart of arbitrator
nationality. Id.
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procedural regularity.30 Quite remarkably, there is little discussion
about the sources of the imbalance and the justifications that
sustain it: a gap that this article attempts to begin to fill.
At the most general level, the dominant narrative is that
"[i]nvestment arbitration is a success story"3' and, of course, ICSID
is a major part of it-with NAFTA Chapter 11 arbitrations
exemplifying the alleged success. 32 Measured by caseload growth
and enforcement track-record, ICSID has indeed been a "success
story." Having stayed almost dormant for decades -averaging
one to four cases a year -the caseload began an upward trajectory
in 1997, then receiving ten cases and steadily increasing to reach
thirty-eight cases by the end of 2011.33 This "success" is attributed
to several factors, including the phenomenal growth of BITs, most
of which provide for free access to investor-state arbitration.3 4
As the foundational assumption that BITs improve the
developing world's ability to attract foreign investment has
increasingly come under scrutiny,35 and a critical mass of
investment treaty arbitration decisions and awards became
publicly available for review, critical inquiries about the legitimacy
of the system as a whole began to emerge. Bolivia's public
renunciation of the Convention in 2007,36 and Ecuador's similar
30 See infra notes 38-67 and accompanying text (discussing the mainstream
scholarly discourse surrounding the coherence and consistency of ICSID tribunal
decisions).
31 August Reinisch, The Future of Investment Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21sT CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTOPH
SCHREUER 894, 894 (Christina Binder, Ursula Kriebaum, August Reinisch &
Stephan Wittich eds., 2009).
32 The public attention to the Methanex case supports this notion. Methanex
Corp. v. United States, NAFTA Arbitral Tribunal, Final Award on Jurisdiction and
Merits (Aug. 3, 2005), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/51052.pdf. See DePalma, supra
note 24, at 1, 5 (highlighting the ICSID arbitration case Methanex v. United States
and discussing the use of investment arbitration due to the vast reach of
multinational corporations).
33 ICSID 2012 STATISTICS, supra note 12, at 7. The total cases as of that date are
369. This figure includes the ICSID Additional Facilities cases.
34 See Reinisch, supra note 31, at 895. Currently, there are approximately 3000
BITs in effect.
35 See, e.g., Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 8 (arguing that BITs do help
countries promote foreign direct investment, though the benefits are slow to
appear).
36 Press Release, ICSID, Bolivia Submits a Notice Under Article 71 of the
ICSID Convention (May 16, 2007), available at https://icsid.worldbank.
org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=OpenPage&PageTyp
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action in 2009,37 fueled the curiosity of the scholarly community,
resulting in the production of a corpus of instructive commentary
on the legitimacy of the international investment arbitration
system in general and ICSID in particular.38
e=AnnouncementsFrame&FromPage=NewsReleases&pageName=Announcemen
t3 ("On May 2, 2007, the World Bank received a written notice of denunciation of
the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States (the ICSID Convention) from the Republic of Bolivia. In
accordance with Article 71 of the ICSID Convention, the denunciation will take
effect six months after the receipt of Bolivia's notice, i.e., on November 3, 2007. In
its capacity as the depository of the ICSID Convention, and as required by Article
75 of the ICSID Convention, the World Bank has notified all ICSID signatory
States of the Republic of Bolivia's denunciation of the ICSID Convention.").
37 Press Release, ICSID, Ecuador Submits a Notice Under Article 71 of the
ICSID Convention (July 9, 2009), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=OpenPage&PageType=Announc
ementsFrame&FromPage=NewsReleases&pageName=Announcement2O ("On
July 6, 2009, the World Bank received a written notice of denunciation of the
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States (the ICSID Convention) from the Republic of Ecuador.
In accordance with Article 71 of the ICSID Convention, the denunciation will take
effect six months after the receipt of Ecuador's notice, i.e., on January 7, 2010. In
its capacity as the depository of the ICSID Convention, and as required by Article
75 of the ICSID Convention, the World Bank has notified all ICSID signatory
States of the Republic of Ecuador's denunciation of the ICSID Convention.").
38 Chief among them is INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21sT
CENTURY, supra note 31. Another example is the Harvard International Law
Journal, which largely dedicated the second issue of its 50th volume, published in
the summer of 2009, to this topic. 50 HARV. INT'L L.J. (2009), available at
http://www.harvardilj.org/2009/06/issue-50-2. Around the same time period,
the Chicago Journal of International Law (Vol. 9, Winter 2009) and the Suffolk
Transnational Law Review also dedicated symposium issues to this issue. 9 CHI. J.
INT'L L. (2009); 32 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. (2009). Summarizing the objectives
and proceedings of the Suffolk symposium, Professor David Caron noted: "In
this Symposium's discussion of investor state arbitration, there may at first blush
appear to be two very different points of perspective. On the one hand, a number
of the articles view investor state arbitration as a system from afar: The view from
'20,000 feet.' On the other hand, a number of articles are from the perspective of
having been involved in individual arbitrations: The view from 'in the trenches.'
At the level of individual arbitrations, questions often focus on how to win, or
how to survive, the arbitration. From the perspective of the system, questions
often focus on how the system of investment arbitration might better meet its
objectives which in part often involve assessments about the legitimacy of the
system as a whole." David D. Caron, Investor State Arbitration: Strategic and
Tactical Perspectives on Legitimacy, 32 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 513, 513 (2009).
Other notable parts of this corpus include a collection of essays in THE BACKLASH
AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY (Michael Waibel et
al. eds., 2010) and Gus VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC
LAW (2007).
U. Pa. J. Int' L.
The most serious indictment of the system, of course, goes to
the very essence of the investor-state arbitration system and the
arbitrator accountability issue. Gus Van Harten describes these
concerns very well: "arbitrators autonomously resolve core
questions of public law: whether legislation is discriminatory,
whether regulation is expropriation, whether a court decision is
unfair or inequitable.... Th[e] lack of judicial supervision renders
the arbitrator's interpretation of public law -itself a fundamentally
sovereign act -unaccountable in the conventional sense." 39
Professor David Caron analyzes the dominant narrative about
ICSID legitimacy concerns under four headings: "(1) the
coherency of the system, (2) the integrity of decision-makers, (3)
the representation of the public and (4) the curtailment of state
public choice."40
The concern that is often framed in the context of coherency
essentially pertains to the consistency of the substantive
jurisprudence that the tribunals have generated over the last half-
century.41 Professor Caron does not believe that the jurisprudence
is so incoherent as to deprive "the system" of legitimacy.42 Indeed,
he argues, rather convincingly, that "the root of the problem is
embedded very deeply in the structure of arbitration itself"
because, in essence, it is not "a system" but "a framework" within
which investment claims are resolved under very diverse legal
regimes much like commercial arbitration.43 For him, the challenge
39 VAN HARTEN, supra note 38, at 156.
40 Caron, supra note 38, at 516.
41 This is one of the main factors that attracted the most commentary. See,
e.g., JAN PAULSSON, DENIAL OF JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 241 (2005) ("[T]he
idea is not consistency at any cost, but respectable consistency."); Charles N.
Brower & Stephan W. Schill, Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the Legitimacy of
International Investment Law?, 9 CHI. J. INT'L L. 471 (2009) (positing that, although
inconsistency is currently a problem, the passage of time will lead to more
uniform results); Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty
Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73
FORDHAM L. REV. 1521 (2005) (proposing the creation of a permanent appellate
body, enhanced transparency, and increased academic scrutiny in order to combat
inconsistency); Jacques Werner, Making Investment Arbitration More Certain: A
Modest Proposal, 4 J. WORLD INVESTMENT 767 (2003) (endorsing an appellate level of
review for investment arbitration decisions and arguing that arbitrators should
play an active role in consolidating proceedings or staying decisions where other
arbitral panels have already issued an award).
42 Caron, supra note 38, at 516.
43 Id. Caron rejects the idea that commercial and investment arbitrations are
recognizably distinct. Id. at 513-14.
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of coherency is inherent.44 In fact, to the extent there is coherency,
it is more "coincidental than planned."45 Moreover, coherency is
more of an academic concern than a practical one because the users
of the investment dispute settlement framework seem to tolerate a
significant level of irregularity that academics might consider
erroneous. 46 Caron similarly rejects the academic call for appellate
discipline because, according to him, there is "little evident desire
thus far on behalf of parties and states to build appeal structures
which might yield greater consistency." 47
Other critics give the issue of jurisprudential coherence more
weight than Professor Caron because, unlike a purely private
commercial arbitration, ICSID tribunals often sit in judgment of a
sovereign act with profound public implications. For example,
following the rendering of conflicting awards against the Czech
Republic in CME v. Czech Republic48 and Lauder v. Czech Republic,49
Blackaby of Freshfields is quoted as saying: "Any system where
diametrically opposed decisions can legally coexist cannot last
long. It shocks the sense of rule of law or fairness."50 These two
cases, along with the expressions of frustration by lawyers, are
profound demonstrations of jurisprudential incoherency that
characterizes investment arbitration today. Both cases were
predicated on the same BIT provision and involved the same
44 Id. at 516.
45 Id. at 517 ("ICSID can be schizophrenic in this way--on the one hand,
imagining ICSID as a framework calls for a concentrated focus on the particular
dispute, while at the same time, imagining ICSID as a system represents an
attempt to rearrange all of the free standing arbitrations as though they were part
of a court system. This situation can lead to great surprise and frustration when
the realization hits home that the patterns that sometimes present are more
coincidental than planned. The question of whether there is a system present
depends on whether the questions shared by the various tribunals are identical, or
perhaps nearly so. Certainly ICSID tribunals share the procedural and
jurisdictional limitations of the ICSID convention, but they do not necessarily
address the same identical substantive questions since usually different
concessions or BITs are involved.").
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award
(Sept. 13, 2001), 9 ICSID Rep. 121 (2006); 14 WORLD TRADE & ARB. MAT'LS 109
(2002) (cited in Reinisch, supra note 31, at 907).
49 Lauder v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award (Sept. 3, 2001), 9
ICSID Rep. 66 (2006); WORLD TRADE & ARB. MAT'LS, supra note 48.
50 VAN HARTEN, supra note 38, at 166 (citation omitted).
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issues.51 While, in Lauders, the tribunal denied recovery, in CME, it
awarded the investor nearly $500 million.52
Broadening the inquiry further, Van Harten suggests that "the
burden of incoherence is borne most by those countries that lack
the legal and administrative capacity effectively to fight off, or
deter, investor claims."53 According to Reinisch, "[w]hat is far
more serious for the acceptance of investment arbitration in
general is a potential loss of confidence stemming from
incomprehensible, unpredictable, and/or contradictory decisions
and awards."54 He notes that, in recent times, the manifestations of
the jurisprudential incoherence touch the very sensitive balance
between the State's sovereign regulatory right and private
investment protection as exemplified by environmental cases such
as the Methanex case.55 Some others, however, suggest that there
already is sufficient coherence that sustains the regime,5 6 while
others are hopeful that jurisprudential coherence and predictability
will come through time.57
51 See Reinisch, supra note 31, at 907 (mentioning the similarities of the
Lauders and CME cases).
52 Id. at 907-08.
s3 VAN HARTEN, supra note 38, at 167.
5 Reinisch, supra note 31, at 904.
5s See id. at 903 (citing Methanex Corp. v. United States, Final Award on
Jurisdiction and Merits (NAFTA Arb. Trib. 2005)). There are many investment
arbitration cases involving the issue of indirect expropriation. For a recent
analysis and additional citations, see SuzY H. NIKIEMA, IISD BEST PRACTICES
INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION (2012), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2012/
best practice indirect-expropriation.pdf. For an older NAFTA-focused analysis
of the issue, see Vicki Been & Joel C. Beauvias, The Global Fifth Amendment?
NAFTA's Investment Protections and the Misguided Quest for an International
"Regulatory Takings" Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 30 (2003).
56 Most notably, in his 2010 article, Professor Salacuse, employing regime
theory, suggests that there is "a surprisingly high degree of uniformity and
consistency." Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Emerging Global Regime for Investment, 51
HARV. INT'L L.J. 427, 467 (2010). He attributes this to the similarity in the
substantive rules contained in the nearly 3000 BITs, and to decision making by
"the epistemic community" of similarly situated mainly Western arbitrators who
produce the bulk of the jurisprudence. Id. at 465.
57 See Brower & Schill, supra note 41, at 473-74 ("While some of these
problems, in particular unpredictability and incoherence in investor-state dispute
settlement, are considerable and in need of serious attention, arguably a solution
will come with the passage of time. Increasing dispute-settlement procedures and
doctrinal efforts promise to prove that concepts relating to investors' rights, such
as fair and equitable treatment and indirect expropriation, are not as vague and
indeterminate as some argue. They increasingly will provide yardsticks for the
judicial settlement of disputes that have proven to be workable not only in several
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The second concern pertains to the integrity of the decision
makers. Although it is, at times, "[p]hrased in terms of
illegitimacy, this critique becomes an assertion of corruption."58
Caron notes that because outright corruption among arbitrators is
rare, the legitimacy concern relating to corruption in essence
touches the "identity, equality, independence and impartiality of
arbitrators." 59 Although he identifies the problems and states them
very well, he does not belabor the issue further except critiquing
the proposal to create a permanent panel of arbitrators as
impracticable and unattractive to the parties who would want to
nominate their own arbitrators.60
The third concern is the denial of the representation of the
public interest -in other words, the State, which is the respondent
in investment arbitration, may not necessarily represent the
interests of the communities that may be affected by the outcome
of the arbitration.61 Professor Caron puts it in its proper context by
saying "[e]levating the community past the state respondent
creates a number of obvious political tensions" 62 and suggests that
civil society involvement through amicus filings might be a good
solution.63
The fourth concern is more fundamental and one which
concerns the curtailing of state public interest, especially in
regulatory takings cases. This concern goes to the heart of what
Van Harten explains as the accountability problems of "The
Businessman's Court" sitting in judgment of sovereign decisions.64
international fora- such as the Iran-US Claims Tribunal or the various claims
commissions established at the beginning of the twentieth century to solve
investment-related disputes-but also in domestic courts that entertain disputes
concerning the relationship between property protection and competing private
and public interests. Thus, the passage of time-bringing with it a continuous
stream of investment jurisprudence, a refinement of state practice and treaty
making, and growing doctrinal analysis -may help create a better understanding
of the content and scope of the central principles of investment protection and
result in the creation of a jurisprudence constante.") (footnotes omitted).
58 Caron, supra note 38, at 518.
59 Id.
6 Id. at 519. A very interesting point Professor Caron notes from experience
is how "parties at present will go to great lengths to avoid ICSID making the
appointment of the chair from its roster." Id.
61 Id. at 520.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 VAN HARTEN, supra note 38, at 152-84.
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Professor Caron suggests that the convergence of interests around
this issue, as exemplified by China's increasing outward
investment and changing attitudes, might help resolve the problem
in the long term.65 While that is true in some respects when China
is taken in isolation, the fundamental question is enduring.
Apart from the macro level systemic concerns, there are
concerns at the micro level involving each arbitration; they largely
include mundane challenges that any kind of adjudicatory system
faces, such as efficacy, cost, competence, poor reasoning, and
ethics.66 There is no shortage of suggestions as to how to make
improvements in these areas. 67
2.1. Empirical Studies
ICSID does make vital information about most cases, including
the names of arbitrators and counsels, available on its website.68
However, there is a dearth of comprehensive and systematic
empirical analysis of these cases. With that note, this section
proceeds to review the limited available studies in association with
the ICSID database and sets the stage for the Africa-specific
assessment in the next sections.
As of March 28, 2012, the ICSID database shows that 233 cases
have been concluded and 142 cases are pending. 69 While seventy
percent of the arbitrators have come from Western Europe and
North America, only two percent of all arbitrators have come from
Sub-Saharan Africa.70 In terms of the host states, while only one
percent of cases involved Western European states, sixteen percent
of all cases involved Sub-Saharan African states.7 1 ICSID data
65 Caron, supra note 38, at 521 ("The old dichotomy has ceased to exist for
some and we now find ourselves in a much more nuanced situation. In other
terms, we could say that there once were upstream states and downstream states.
But now there is only a lake where there is a convergence of interest of the states
bordering the lake.").
66 Id. at 522-23.
67 See, e.g., Reinisch, supra note 31, at 908-16 (proposing means of quality
assurance, appellate mechanism and de facto precedence).
68 ICSID Cases, ICSID, https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet
?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=ShowHome&pageName=CasesHome (last
visited March 18, 2013).
69 List of ICSID Cases, ISCID, http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet





further shows that while eighty-five percent of all cases involved
an investor from a developed country as the claimant and a
developing country as the respondent, only ten percent of all cases
involved an investor from a developing country as the claimant
and a developing country as the respondent.72 Quite interestingly,
one of the two empirical studies of the ICSID database conducted
recently suggests that arbitrators from developing countries
arbitrate cases mainly between an investor from a developing
country and a developing state.73 Most significantly, ninety-five
percent of all arbitrators so far have been men-described as
"members of an exclusive and lucrative club, whose members are
sometimes compared to a club of mainly European, gray-haired
and well-connected men."74 No sophisticated empirical studies are
needed to prove the glaring diversity deficit, but what do the
studies conclude?
The Convention's requirements of arbitrator qualifications are
generic: good moral character, impartiality, and technical
competence.75 This rule cannot explain the disproportionately
Western appointments. Explanation may lay in history, location,
and affiliation. No attempt is made to provide comprehensive
explanation here; however, it is important to note that such
appointments necessitate the hiring of counsel with similar
background which makes them acceptable to the arbitrators.
Apparently for that reason, developing host states hire European
and American law firms disproportionately. 76 The fees for leading
arbitration specialists sometimes exceed $1000 per hour, which
does not include additional fees for their associates at several
hundred dollars an hour.77  Remarkably, by contrast, most
developed countries mostly rely on in-house counsel in ICSID
cases.78
72 Id. For the World Bank's and OECD's classification of "developing" and
"developed" nations, see Franck Study, supra note 28, at 446-47.
7 Waibel & Wu Study, supra note 17, at 27.
74 Id. at 18.
75 ICSID Convention, supra note 4, at art. 14(1).
76 See Waibel & Wu Study, supra note 17, at 28. ("[Alrbitrators from
developing countries are significantly underrepresented. The proximate cause
goes deeper: most host countries hire European and US law firms and legal
counsel to defend against ICSID claims.") (footnote omitted).
7 Id. (citing SCHREUER, supra note 4, at art. 60, para. 8).
78 See Waibel & Wu Study, supra note 17, at 21 ("For example, the United
States, Mexico, Canada and Argentina, which account for twenty percent of
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A couple of focused, smaller empirical studies have tested the
impact of certain personal characteristics of arbitrators on case
outcome. The first such study was conducted by Professor Susan
Franck of Washington and Lee Law School. She describes her
findings in her article titled "Development and Outcomes of
Investment Treaty Arbitration." 79 The second empirical study was
conducted by Professors Michael Waibel of Lauterpacht Center at
Cambridge and Yanhui Wu of USC Marshall School of Business. It
is titled "Are Arbitrators Political?"80 Although they do not focus
on the exact same set of variables, the two studies arrive at
inconsistent findings to the extent they converge on the topics.
Such inconsistencies might suggest the inevitable shortcomings of
quantitative and even qualitative measurements of outcome to
assess the nature or quality of justice in these kinds of cases;
however, a combination of quantitative studies and a careful
qualitative examination of selected cases might shed some light on
the reality of ICSID arbitral justice. Therefore, the following
sections focus on the above cited quantitative studies followed by a
careful review of selected cases involving African states to measure
the nature of justice that they have been receiving from ICSID
tribunals in the last half-century.
2.2. A Closer Look at the Empirical Studies
It is fair to say that the ICSID database has been ripe for
empirical analysis. While more comprehensive analysis is almost
certainly forthcoming, the inquiry here will be limited to the two
relatively recent studies mentioned above.
Professor Susan Franck's study empirically tested three
hypotheses:
First, what kind of interaction effect might exist between
the development status of the government respondent and
the development status of the presiding arbitrator that
could influence the outcome? Second, how does the
respondent's development status affect outcome, if at all?
respondent states in our dataset, routinely handle all aspects of investment
disputes in-house. Outside attorneys are only used on occasion to supplement in-
house legal capabilities.").
79 Franck Study, supra note 28.
80 Waibel & Wu, supra note 17.
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Third, how does the presiding arbitrator's development
status affect outcome, if at all? In other words, is there a
main effect for either respondent state's development status
or presiding arbitrator's development status?81
What the Franck Study labels "development status" is
apparently the development status of the country that hosts the
investment which generated the controversy, and the development
status of the country of the presiding arbitrator's nationality.82 The
Study relied on two sources for the determination of development
status: OECD membership and World Bank's income based
classification (high-upper-middle-lower-middle and low income.)83
The Study found that "there was no significant pattern of
relationship between the World Bank status of the presiding
arbitrator, the World Bank status of the respondent state, and the
winner of an investment treaty arbitration."84 It further found that
for the selected sample of awards, "the number of winners and
losers were statistically equivalent."85
To arrive at this conclusion, the Franck Study analyzed forty-
nine cases presided over by forty-nine arbitrators rendering forty-
seven awards. A closer look at the numbers suggests that thirty-six
of the forty-nine arbitrators came from high income or OCED
countries. The representation of upper-middle, lower-middle and
low-income countries was 8-5-0 respectively.86 Because there were
zero presiding arbitrators from low-income countries, the Study
collapsed the numbers corresponding to the upper-middle and
lower-middle countries, i.e., eight plus five and ran the equation
against the thirty-six.87 That is how it found statistical equivalency
and concluded that "[t]he consistency in these results offers a
powerful narrative that there is procedural integrity in investment
arbitration."88
Before observations about these findings are offered, it
important to look at one additional and interesting finding, which
81 Franck Study, supra note 28, at 454 (footnotes omitted).
82 Id. at n.111 and accompanying text.
83 Id. at 455-56.
84 Id. at 462.
85 Id. at 460.
86 Id. at 459 tbl.2.
87 Id. at 459-60.
88 Id. at 464.
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is that "presiding arbitrators from the developing world made
larger awards against developing countries and smaller awards
against developed countries."89 This being the only source of bias
the Study found, it suggests that "[e]ven at this stage, it is worth
considering what should be done to address the potential bias of
arbitrators from the developing world in favor of the developed
world."90 In trying to explain the possible source of bias, the Study
speculates that "[it] may be that arbitrators from the developing
world (particularly those seeking repeat appointments) believe that
rulings in favor of the developed world are the price of admission
to the 'club."'91
Several observations could be made about this study. First, it
looks at the least controversial issue. There is little concern, if any,
that arbitrators might be biased for or against a state based on its
level of development. If the United States enacts environmental
laws that render Canadian investment in California unprofitable,
the development stage of the potential presiding arbitrator's
country might be the last thing that the selection process would
look at as the ideological leanings and previous track-record are
more important than whether he or she is from Australia or
Indonesia. It is clear that a person's ideological leanings could be
influenced by that person's upbringing, education, exposure,
personal interest, and a whole host of other factors, which might
include place of birth or perhaps, more importantly, place of
residence. Nationality, however, is simply a poor indicator of
political, ideological, or any other kind of bias. Second, the
numbers do not seem to be well-balanced for a valid quantitative
measurement when the study is forced to collapse categories to
help the analysis. One notable fact is that there were no presiding
arbitrators from low-income countries in the dataset although low-
income countries routinely arbitrate cases before ICSID. That is
one of the fundamental deficits that the Study fails to adequately
address. Third, the Study concludes that to the extent there is bias
or even lack of integrity, it implicates arbitrators from developing
countries who seem to impose more substantial penalties in the
form of an award against developing countries possibly motivated
by their desire to be more acceptable to the "club." While the
finding itself seems interesting, the attributed motive almost
89 Id. at 478.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 479.
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contradicts the main finding, i.e., lack of development-based bias.
A question might be asked, if the "club" is not entirely biased, why
would arbitrators from developing countries think that they would
gain more acceptance by imposing more significant awards against
developing countries -unless, of course, they are misjudging their
colleagues' perceptions, which the study does not suggest. Finally,
the Study omits the most serious and more credible allegation of
bias, namely, ideological bias in favor of private investors (read
multi-national corporations) no matter where they make their
investment. This question is often framed as "investor-bias" or
"host-country-bias." 92 Nobody could credibly allege that such bias
is decisively associated with the development status of the
arbitrator's country of nationality. Significantly, however,
Professor Franck's previouS 93 and subsequent studies more or less
replicated the same results.94
Drawing on the rich social science literature that substantially
assesses the impact of personal characteristics - such as political
ideology and collegiate politics -on case outcomes in domestic
court litigation,95 Waibel and Wu test different hypotheses relative
92 The Franck Study expressly excludes this inquiry. See id. at 479 n.16 and
accompanying text ("This research does not evaluate differences in whether
investors come from the developed or developing world because approximately
10% of investors were from developing world.").
93 In her 2007 study, finding no pro-investor bias, Professor Franck concludes
that "[riecognizing the limitations, the initial descriptive quantitative data from
public awards suggest investment treaty arbitration appears to be functioning
relatively well. There is, nevertheless, room for improvement." Susan D. Franck,
Empirically Evaluating Claims About Investment Treaty Arbitration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1,
83 (2007).
9 Her 2011 study that compared the ICSID case outcome with other
investment arbitrations also finds no bias on the basis of the development status
(expressly noting Latin America). Susan Franck, The ICSID Effect? Considering
Potential Variations in Arbitration Awards, 51 VA. J. INT'L L. 825, 913 (2011).
95 Among the sources they rely on are: RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING
LAW (1995) (criticizing originalism in favor of a mixture of liberalism, pragmatism,
and economics); GLENDON A. SCHUBERT, QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL
BEHAVIOR (1959) (exploring bloc voting among Supreme Court justices, the
justices' incentives to vote in such blocs, and the consistency of the justices'
stances on recurring topics); Orley Ashenfelter, Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J.
Schwab, Politics and the Judiciary: The Influence of Judicial Background on Case
Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 281 (1995) ("In the mass of cases that are filed ...
the law-not the judge -dominates the outcomes."); Michael A. Bailey & Forrest
Maltzman, Does Legal Doctrine Matter? Unpacking Law and Policy Preferences on the
U.S. Supreme Court, 102 AM. J. POL. Sci., 369 (2008) (determining that law can play
an important role in a judge's opinion, as demonstrated by statistical analyses into
stare decisis, deference to Congress, and protection of speech); William N.
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to ICSID case outcome, focusing on decisions on jurisdiction and
host state liability. Relevant for the purposes of this article are the
following hypotheses: (1) "Arbitrators who are pro-investor will
tend to vote in favor of affirming jurisdiction and liability of host
states. Conversely, arbitrators who are pro-state are more likely to
favor the host state;"96 (2):
Arbitrators who judge the actions of host countries that
belong to the same legal family will tend to assert
jurisdiction less often and hold the host state liable on fewer
occasions. Conversely, when arbitrators judge the actions
of a host country belonging to a different legal family, they
will be more likely to affirm jurisdiction and hold the host
state liable;97
and (3) "Arbitrators from developing countries are less likely to
hold the host country liable because they are more familiar with
Eskridge, Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L. J.
331, 334 (1991) (asserting that Congress is most likely to override the Supreme
Court's statutory decisions when the Court is ideologically fragmented, "relies on
the text's plain meaning and ignores legislative signals, and/or rejects positions
taken by federal, state, or local governments"); Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior
on the United States Court of Appeals, 1961-1964, 60 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 374, 379
(1966) (detailing the voting behavior of judges and how their political leanings
may play a part); Daniel E. Ho & Erica L. Ross, Did Liberal Justices Invent the
Standing Doctrine? An Empirical Study of the Evolution of Standing, 1921-2006, 62
STAN. L. REV. (2010) (contending that liberal justices created the standing doctrine
so that administrative agencies would not be subject to judicial review); Stuart S.
Nagel, Political Party Affiliation and Judges' Decisions, 55 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 843, 844
(1961) (revealing data comparing judges' decisions and political party lines); C.
Neal Tate, Personal Attribute Models of the Voting Behavior of U.S. Supreme Court
Justices: Liberalism in Civil Liberties and Economics Decisions, 1946-1978, 75 AM. POL.
Sci. REv. 355, 366 (1981) (identifying personal attributes among judges, such as
appointing president, past legal experience, and prestige of pre-law education,
and concluding that their "influence ... is transmitted directly and powerfully to
judicial voting behavior"); Timothy B. Tomasi & Jess A. Velona, All the President's
Men? A Study of Ronald Reagan's Appointments to the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 766, 767 (1987) (assessing the conservatism of Reagan-appointed
judges and finding that "Reagan judges are not significantly more conservative
than their Republican colleagues"). Most notably, they cite DAVID W. RHODE &
HAROLD J. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 72 (1976) (noting that "judges
base their decisions solely upon personal policy preferences"); JEFFREY A. SEGAL &
HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 64, 86 (1993)
("[T]he Supreme Court decides disputes before it in light of the facts of the case
vis-A-vis precedent, the plain meaning of the Constitution and statutes, the intent
of the framers, and a balancing of societal versus constitutional interests.").
96 Waibel & Wu Study, supra note 17, at 21.
97 Id. at 22-23.
THE CHINA-AFRICA FACTOR
the economic and social conditions in developing countries and
host countries[,] the more likely source of future arbitral
appointments." 98
The first hypothesis is almost a restatement of the obvious: a
decision maker's ideological leanings impact his decisions.
Property rights are a subject of serious ideology controversy. As
discussed at length above, the ideological divide is enduring.
Although the study used proxies as indicators of the ideological
leanings of the arbitrators, 99 the finding is not surprising because it
is clear that the parties spend significant amounts of time and
resources in selecting arbitrators who are likely to be ideologically
sympathetic to their side.
The second proposition is also not surprising because of the
inherent human inclination to understand and appreciate the
familiar. The third proposition, likewise, is not surprising for the
same reasons, that is, familiarity and understanding of the
circumstances.
The above-noted studies share the same characteristics;
however, they all avoid the most fundamental question of the
impact of the diversity deficit on outcome. Stated differently, what
is the overall price of the cultural barrier that the Africans face
when appearing before tribunals composed largely of Western
arbitrators represented by counsel and firms who must necessarily
share the judges' cultural backgrounds? It might be impossible to
empirically measure the cost or explicate the barrier, but the
remainder of this article attempts to assess how African states have
fared in the last half-century by looking at the available data and
reviewing selected cases. Before that is provided, however, it is
important to look at the historical background to understand why
Africa signed on to this project and how that might affect its
continued use of ICSID with its new partners-a framework
arguably designed for a different purpose.
3. AFRICA'S ICSID STORY: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Prior to the adoption of the text of the Convention, the World
Bank conducted extensive consultations with various stakeholders
from Africa to South America. Fortunately, ICSID has made
98 Id. at 23.
99 Id. at 22. The proxy is not a perfect one-they use frequency of
appointment by one party or the other as an indication of the political leanings as
pro-investor or pro-state. Id. at 34-40.
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summaries of the records available in multiple volumes under the
title History of the Convention.100  This section relies on these
volumes for the discussion of the raison d'6tre as understood by
the Africans and the dilemmas they faced.
3.1. Africa's Position on the Doctrinal Debate
A fundamental doctrinal dilemma underpins the law of
international investment.101 Its cogent articulation may be traced
back to the famous 1938 exchange of letters between U.S. Secretary
of State Cordell Hull and the Mexican Foreign Ministry, prompted
by Mexico's seizure of agrarian property belonging to American
citizens. These exchanges are highly instructive - Mr. Hull wrote:
The taking of property without compensation is not
expropriation. It is confiscation. ... . We cannot question
the right of a foreign government to treat its own nationals
in this fashion if it so desires. This is a matter of domestic
concern. But we cannot admit that a foreign government
may take the property of American nationals in disregard
of the rule of compensation under international law. Nor
can we admit that any government unilaterally and
through its municipal legislation can, as in this instant case,
nullify this universally accepted principle of international
law, based as it is on reason, equity and justice. . . . . The
right of prompt and just compensation for expropriated
property is a part of this [international legal] structure.102
The response of the Mexican Minster of Foreign Affairs was
equally fascinating:
My Government maintains . .. [that] there does not exist in
international law any principle universally accepted by
countries, nor by the writers of treatises on this subject, that
would render obligatory the giving of adequate
compensation for expropriations of a general and
100 HISTORY OF ICSID, supra note 8.
101 The Law of International Investment refers to a set of procedural and
substantive rules that generally govern the relationship between the foreign
investor, the state of the investor's nationality, and the host state. THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 6 (Peter Muchlinski, Frederico
Ortino & Christoph Schreuer eds., 2008).
102 Letter from Cordell Hull, U.S. Secretary of State, to Mex. Ambassador to
the U.S. (July 21, 1938), excerpted in LOWENFELD, supra note 3, at 476.
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impersonal character. Nevertheless, Mexico admits, in
obedience to her own laws, that she is indeed under
obligation to indemnify in an adequate manner; but the
doctrine which she maintains on the subject, which is based
on the most authoritative opinions of writers of treatises on
international law, is that the time and manner of such
payment must be determined by her own laws. 03
This classic adaptation of what is popularly known as the
Calvo doctrine undoubtedly provided the philosophical impetus
for the initial unanimous rejection of the idea of a World Bank
affiliated supranational arbitral body by the South American
countries.104 When the ICSID proposal was presented at the annual
meeting of the Bank in Tokyo in 1964, all South American states
voted "no" prompting the Latin press to famously tout "El No de
Tokyo."105  A World Bank affiliated commentator aptly
characterized it as the "Calvoesque rejection of foreign
intervention." 106
The Bank's exchanges with the South American jurists during
one of the legal consultative meetings in June 1964 provide
valuable insight as to where they stood on the philosophical
question and in fact offer good contrast with the African jurists'
position discussed below. The discussion was led by the then-
World Bank General Counsel Aron Broches, who later became the
first Secretary General of ICSID, subsequently serving in that
capacity for thirteen years.107
On the afternoon of Monday, February 3, 1964, Mr. Broches
opened the first session of the consultative meeting in Santiago,
Chile. The first reaction he received was the following seemingly
103 Letter from Mex. Minister of Foreign Affairs to U.S. Ambassador (Aug. 3,
1938), excerpted in LOWENFELD, supra note 3, at 477.
104 Id. at 540.
105 Id.
106 Paul C. Szasz, The Investment Disputes Convention and Latin America, 11 VA.
J. INT'L L. 256, 259 (1971). Although there are other related reasons for the Latin
American countries' rejection of the idea, it is clear that the dominant reason was
one derived from the Calvo doctrine: "that the Convention, which of course can
be used only in relation to an alien investor, offends against the rule that
foreigners must be treated equally with citizens." Id. at 261 (citing Jos6 R.
Chiriboga, International Arbitration, 4 INT'L LAW 801, 804 (1970)).
107 Aron Broches Retires as Vice President and General Counsel, THE WORLD BANK,
http://go.worldbank.org/JDT8LQZ890 (last visited Mar. 18, 2013).
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supportive statement by the representative of the Chilean
Government, Mr. Brunner:
[T]he draft convention touched on novel problems and
concepts in the field of international law in giving
individuals direct access to States before international
tribunals. The most enlightened jurists had long denied
that only States could be subjects of international law . . . .
Direct access of individuals to an international jurisdiction
which was found in the Statute of the Central American
Court of Justice and had been acquiring increasing
importance in the European Economic Community was
being projected upon the world plane through the initiative
of the International Bank.108
As the day progressed, stronger opinions were expressed. Mr.
Ribeiro of Brazil made the following classic Calvoesquian
statement: "[Diespite the optional character of the draft
Convention, foreign investors would be granted a legally
privileged position, in violation of the principle of full equality
before the law." 109 Similarly, Mr. Escobar of Bolivia said:
[T]he sovereignty of States could not be subordinated to the
authority of an international institution without being
seriously impaired... those responsible for preparing the
draft had failed to appreciate its adverse effects. Thus the
Bank itself seemed to be displaying a lack of confidence in
the institutions of the countries wishing to attract foreign
capital.1n0
Having made that statement, he finally urged the Bank to abandon
the idea altogether."
Another salient issue that the South American experts raised
was the proposed affiliation of the Centre with the World Bank
and, related to that, its location at the Headquarters of the Bank in
Washington, D.C. Some experts suggested that it be allowed to
108 HISTORY OF ICSID, supra note 8, at 305. Note that this statement is a
summary contained in the report. It is not an exact transcription of the delegate's
statements.
1o9 Id. at 306.




function in the country where the dispute arose.112 Responding to
these types of concerns, the chair said that if the affiliation of the
Centre with the Bank were agreed upon, its location would be of
secondary importance, and "should be decided on grounds of
practicability."11 3
Despite Mr. Broches' able chairmanship and great efforts to
convince, the negative sentiment dominated the entire consultative
process, explaining the nearly universal rejection of the idea by the
South American states.
Commentators later criticized the rejection. According to
Szasz, for example, "[Tihe Centre, as an international institution in
which all Contracting States participate equally, must not be
considered as a foreign power of the type against which the Latin
Americans had for generations girded themselves." 114 In an effort
to encourage the South American countries to accept the
Convention, the same commentator warned that they were in
competition with "capital-hungry and more flexible States."115
Although there is no reference to specific countries, it is clear that
the reference was made to African countries, which
overwhelmingly accepted the Convention with enthusiasm from
the very beginning. What then explains such a radically different
approach by two capital receiving continents with relatively
similar colonial experience? Did they have differing philosophical
understandings? Where did Africa stand on the Hull-Calvo
debate?
Former International Court of Justice President, Judge T.O.
Elias expresses the dominant customary African conception of the
ownership of land as: "I conceive that land belongs to a vast
family of which many are dead, few are living, and countless
members are unborn.""x6 He notes that these conceptions are
largely shared across many African societies.'17 Although the
expression suggests some form of communalism, individual
possessory rights are recognized. Such rights were almost
112 Id. at 312-13 (statement of Mr. Salazar, representative of Ecuador).
113 Id. at 313 (statement of Mr. Broches, the Chairman).
114 Szasz, supra note 106, at 259.
us Id. at 265.
116 T. OLAWALE ELIAS, THE NATURE OF AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW 162 (1956)
(quoting a statement made by a Nigerian chief to the West African Lands
Committee in 1912).
117 Id. at n.1 and accompanying text.
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indistinguishable from the concept of fee simple absolute under
common law, except, unlike the Crown in England, the African
customary chiefs never had a claim of ownership of all land and
never considered all inhabitants their tenants. 18 The chief "enjoys
only an administrative right of supervisory oversight of the land
for the benefit of the whole community." 119  Judge Elias
characterizes the African customary land tenure system as
"primitive communism" and describes the rights and
responsibilities of the individual and the group.120 Professor Lesley
Obiora's account of the conditions of alienability of property is
instructive. She writes: "Members of a family, irrespective of sex,
were entitled to occupancy and user rights subject to good
behavior. While rights accruing via citizenship could not be ceded
any more than citizenship on which they rested, persons could
transfer their interest in land that they improved."121 More
importantly, however:
[T]here was a practical restraint on alienation insofar as the
transferee had to be someone acceptable to the local
community because the spatial proximity and the
conditions of production meant that the transferee
invariably associated with and was incorporated into the
community. In this sense, political affiliation modified
particular rights based on creative preemption.122
It is clear, however, that the land and property ownership regime
under African customary law - although replete with
inconsistencies across the various societies-had solid and
sophisticated philosophical foundations and less solicitous of more
rights for outsiders.123
118 Id. at 164.
119 Id. at 164-65.
120 Id. at 83-92.
121 L. Arnede Obiora, Remapping the Domain of Property in Afica, 12 U. FLA. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 57, 60-61 (2000) (citing Elizabeth Colson, The Colonial Period and land
Rights in COLONIALISM IN AFRICA 1870-1960: VOL. 3, PROFILES OF CHANGE: AFRICAN
SOCIETES AND COLONIAL RULE 197, 200 (Peter Duigan, L.H. Gann & Victor Turner
eds., 1971); EUAS, supra note 116, at 167).
122 Obiora, supra note 121, at 60.




As fate would have it, however, with the advent of colonialism,
the philosophical foundations of the African notions of property
and the modes and hierarchy of its allocation were "distort[ed]"
and "disoriented."124 It is evident that " [c]olonial officials assumed
that land must have an owner exercising a full range of rights
parallel to those covered by the European concept of proprietary
ownership." 25  As Professor Obiora further notes, "[t]he
development of new forms of property and technologies of
production, the possibilities of individual acquisition, the
acculturation of different values, reworked patterns of
consumption and the like, redefined the socio-economic terrain."126
Upon independence, most African countries sought refuge in the
communist ideologies of the Soviet Union (USSR), and latterly, the
People's Republic of China (PRC).127 These ideologies have an
unwavering stance on ownership of property. Marxism, the
essential philosophical foundation, holds that private ownership of
property enables the "exploitation of man by man."12 8 It makes no
distinction between citizens and aliens. If the philosophical
foundations of the time were seemingly more aligned with the
Calvo doctrine, what then allured the African states into instantly
accepting ICSID? Examination of the history might shed some
light.
3.2. Why Did African States Accept ICSID?
The historical record clearly indicates that the only reason that
the African states accepted ICSID is because they thought that they
had to do so in order to attract private foreign investment to
124 RENt DAVID & JOHN E.C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD
TODAY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAW, 562 (3d ed. 1985).
Although Professors David and Brierley say this in the broader context of the
impact of colonial legal systems on African customary law, it is clear that the fate
of the law of property was the same.
125 Obiora, supra note 121, at 62.
126 Id. at 66.
127 Beverly I. Moran, Homogenized Law: Can the United States Learn From
Affican Mistakes?, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 361, 367 (2001) (citing MICHAEL HODD,
THE ECONOMIES OF AFRICA 34-35 (1991)). For a fuller discussion of Africa's
relationship with the USSR and PRC, see SOVIET AND CHINESE AID To AFRICAN
NATIONS (Warren Weinstein & Thomas H. Henriksen eds., 1980). For a detailed
description of China's involvement with the African nations, see ALAN
HUTCHINSON, CHINA'S AFRICAN REVOLUTION (1975).
128 KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 172 (1948).
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develop their ailing post-colonial economies.129 Consider the
summary of recorded proceedings of the African legal consultative
meeting that took place in Addis Ababa between December 16 and
20 in 1963.130 This meeting was also chaired by World Bank
General Counsel Broches.13 It focused on at least four aspects of
the proposal: (1) purpose and justification, (2) jurisdiction, (3)
affiliation and location, and (4) panels. 132 Each is discussed briefly
as follows:
3.2.1. Purpose and Justification
The historical record is unambiguous on this point. It suggests
that the participating African legal experts overwhelmingly
believed that a reputable international dispute settlement
mechanism would alleviate Africa's problem of attracting foreign
investment. For example, the Executive Secretary of the Economic
Commission for Africa, in a statement he made at the beginning of
the meeting, said that:
[P]rivate capital was not moving in sufficient volume to
areas in need of capital, one of the most serious
impediments to its flow [was] the fear of investors that their
investment would be exposed to political risks such as
outright expropriation. . . . The Bank had therefore been
led to wonder whether, in view of its reputation for
integrity and its position of impartiality, it could not help in
removing that obstacle to private investment.133
The representatives of almost all of the twenty-nine states present
in that meeting echoed that sentiment while raising some concerns
about the jurisdiction, affiliation, location, and composition of
panels.134 The record interestingly shows that one of the vocal
supporters of the initiative was Judge T.O. Elias, who was then a
young representative of the Nigerian Government many years
129 See HisTORY OF ICSID, supra note 8, at 236 (summarizing a statement by the
Executive Secretary of the Economic Comnmission for Africa calling for a legal
regime to promote private foreign investment).
130 Id. at 236-98.
131 Id. at 236.
132 See infra notes 133-56 and accompanying text (providing a detailed
summary of the delegates' discussion of these four areas).
133 Id. at 240.
13 Id. at 243-98.
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before he ascended to the presidency of the International Court of
Justice.135
3.2.2. Jurisdiction (Powers and Functions of the Centre)
Objections were raised on the most fundamental question of
standing of a private investor to proceed against a sovereign state
in an arbitral forum.136 Questions were also raised in connection
with the complexities of dual nationality, i.e., whether a person
including a juridical person having the nationality of the host state
as well as another Contracting State may avail herself/itself of the
benefits of the Convention.137 A more serious objection to the
jurisdiction of the Centre came from the representatives of
Cameroon and Tunisia, who said that if a state expropriates
property of a foreign investor in the public interest, "the only
question that could be submitted to the Centre [should be the]
adequacy of [the] compensation."138  Related to this, the
representative from Cameroon asked, "where the parties had
undertaken to have recourse to arbitration without specifying the
law to be applied . . . would the tribunal be competent to decide
upon the legality of such a sovereign act, and if so, by reference to
which system of law?"139 Although these objections mirror the
objections of the South American bloc, they were not raised so
vigorously and widely enough as to result in the majority's
rejection of the idea.140
3.2.3. Affiliation and Location
Although the idea that the Centre's affiliation with the Bank
would give it appropriate prestige has not been disputed, concerns
were raised with respect to the role of the President of the Bank as
the chair of the Administrative Council and the location of the
135 Id. at 244 ("In the opinion of his Government the document represented an
attempt not only to restore the confidence of the investor but also to codify certain
principles of customary law and to engage in the progressive development of
international law, and he warmly recommended it.").
136 Id. at 256 ("[T]he effect of Article II, Section 1 would be to place nationals
on a par with States. That represented a departure from customary international
law and was a step which should not be taken lightly.").
137 Id. at 256-57.
138 Id. at 259.
139 Id. at 267.
140 See supra Section 3.1 (discussing the objections of South American
countries to ICSID).
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Centre at the headquarters of the Bank in Washington, D.C. For
example, one representative noted, "while the connection of the
Center with the Bank would give the Center added prestige, the
intention was nonetheless to create an independent body. It might
therefore be desirable to indicate at the outset . . . that the seat of
the Center could be transferred to another location." 141 Similarly,
another delegate questioned the appropriateness of the
appointment of the President of the Bank as the chair of the
Administrative Council. He noted in particular that "certain
countries might not wish to include an arbitration clause in the
possible arrangements owing to the preponderant role of the
Chairman in the functioning" and inquired "whether it would not
be possible to transfer some of the functions at present vested in
the Chairman to some other person or body."142 The Bank's
response to this inquiry was that "the draft Convention had been
drawn upon the assumption that the link with the International
Bank was considered beneficial and that the President of the Bank
was recognized to be a suitable person for the functions vested in
him."143
As far as the place of the proceedings was concerned, at least
two views were expressed: leaving the designation of the place to
the Administrative Council or leaving the choice to the parties,
with the understanding that the arbitral tribunal would pick the
location if the parties failed to agree, similar to most commercial
arbitral rules.144 The final text provided that the "proceeding shall
be held at the seat of the Centre."145 Exceptions included the
Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) at The Hague, any other
facilities with which the Centre had made arrangements, and other
places "approved by the Commission or Tribunal after
consultation with the Secretary-General."146
141 Id. at 248 (statement of the representative of United Arab Republic, Mr.
Moustafa).
142 Id. (statement of the representative of Sierra Leone, Mr. Macaulay).
143 Id. (statement of Mr. Broches, General Counsel of the Bank who chaired
the meeting).
144 Id. at 278 (statements of Mr. Elias of Nigeria and Mr. Macaulay of Sierra
Leone).
145 ICSID Convention, supra note 4, at art. 62.




The discussion on the panels and selection of arbitrators
focused on at least two major points: qualifications and diversity
of nationality. The African experts repeatedly emphasized the
need for appointing persons with appropriate expertise in the field
of international arbitration. For example, the representative of
Dahomey (now the Republic of Benin) urged that the
Administrative Council should make sure that the arbitrators it
appoints are "technically competent." 147 Similarly, Mr. Elias of
Nigeria suggested that:
if the parties to a dispute were to be given the freedom to
appoint to a tribunal or commission persons from outside
the Panels, that freedom should be qualified by a
requirement that the persons so appointed should not be of
a quality inferior to those designated to the Panels [by the
President of the Bank].148
Once the idea of the constitution of a panel of experts from
which arbitrators would be drawn for each case, either by
appointment or party choice, had been agreed to, a heated
discussion ensued on the question of disqualification of arbitrators.
The draft provided that arbitrators appointed by the Chairman
(World Bank President) may only be challenged based on facts that
have occurred subsequent to the appointment, while party-selected
arbitrators may be challenged and disqualified on the basis of "any
fact antecedent or subsequent to their appointment." 149 Because of
the vigorous resistance to the idea of giving the Chairman's
appointees a privileged position with respect to challenge and
disqualification, the Chair of the meeting took note and said that
he would seek further opinion in subsequent deliberation with
147 HISTORY OF ICSID, supra note 8, at 245.
148 Id. at 265.
149 Id. at 276 (statements of Mr. Macaulay representative of Sierra Leone)
("[Ilf, for example, an arbitrator appointed by the Chairman were challenged on
grounds that he had a personal interest in the matter in dispute, the Chairman
would be entitled to say that he had known of that interest but had not considered
it a valid objection to his appointment, and his decision would be
unchallengeable. It is not a matter of questioning the Chairman's integrity but his
judgment.").
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various stakeholders.o50 The final version did indeed abandon
such privileged treatment.151
The importance of prohibiting arbitrators with the nationality
of the disputing parties also raised a controversy. The most
appealing opposition to the idea came from Mr. Moustafa of Egypt
(then called the United Arab Republic). He noted in particular that
"An arbitrator of the same nationality as the party to the dispute was
more likely to understand the issues involved and to be in a better position
to offer the necessary explanations; he might even make an unfavorable
award more acceptable."15 2 He seriously questioned the exact reason
why nationality could exclude an otherwise qualified arbitrator.
The record shows that the chair did not answer this question
satisfactorily but simple said that he personally favored the
exclusion approach.153 The final text also disregarded the idea of
the cultural competence of the arbitrators. It indeed maintained
the idea that arbitrators appointed by the Chair when the parties
fail to agree "shall not be nationals of the Contracting State party to
the dispute or of the Contracting State whose national is a party to
the dispute." 54 Although the merits of this approach might be
debatable, the final text's entire omission of the cultural
competence of arbitrators is worth noting. As a prelude to the
discussions that follow, it is important to take note of the exact
arbitrator qualifications that the Convention provides in Article 14:
(1) Persons designated to serve on the Panels shall be
persons of high moral character and recognized
competence in the fields of law, commerce, industry or
finance, who may be relied upon to exercise independent
judgment. Competence in the field of law shall be of
particular importance in the case of persons on the Panel of
Arbitrators.
(2) The Chairman, in designating persons to serve on the
Panels, shall in addition pay due regard to the importance
of assuring representation on the Panels of the principal
150 Id. at 276 (statement of Mr. Broches, Chair of the meeting).
151 ICSID Convention, supra note 4, at arts. 56-58.
152 HISTORY OF ICSID, supra note 8, at 266 (emphasis added).
153 Id.
54 ICSID Convention, supra note 4, at art. 38.
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legal systems of the world and of the main forms of
economic activity.s55
It is important to note that the required qualifications are
limited to good moral character, technical competence, and
impartiality. 5 6 It is also worth noting that the requirements of
diversity in subsection (2) are limited to legal systems and
economic activity.
4. REVIEW OF THE AFRICA SPECIFIC DATASET: QUANTITATIVE
INDICATORS1 57
As of this writing, the ICSID database contains sixty-four
completed cases involving at least one African state as the
respondent. The data is broken down as follows:
4.1. Arbitrator Nationality
Of the sixty-four completed cases, sixty-one provide arbitrator
nationality. The data shows that the pool of arbitrators in these
cases consisted primarily of Europeans. Of the cases analyzed,
fifty-nine percent of the arbitrators of initial case submissions were
European. Europeans were appointed presidents of tribunals of
initial case submissions in forty-three of the sixty-one cases, which
is roughly seventy percent of the cases. In the cases where
annulment proceedings commenced, twenty-four European
arbitrators were on panels of Ad Hoc committees for the
annulment proceedings. Europeans were appointed presidents of
Ad Hoc committees in ten of the fourteen annulment proceedings,
roughly seventy percent of the proceedings.
North America was the second most represented region. North
American arbitrators made up fourteen percent of the panels of
initial case submissions. North Americans were appointed
presidents of four tribunals of initial case submissions, which is
roughly six percent of the cases. Four North American arbitrators
were on panels of Ad Hoc committee for annulment proceedings
and three North Americans were appointed president of Ad Hoc
committees, which is roughly twenty-one percent of the
committees.
155 Id. at art. 14.
156 Id.
157 The statistical analysis included in this section is entirely based on data
available on the ICSID website. ICSID Cases, ICSID, supra note 68.
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African representation on panels was close behind that of
North America, with African arbitrators making up twelve percent
of the panels of initial case submissions. Africans were appointed
presidents of two tribunals of initial case submissions, which is
roughly three percent of the cases. Eight African arbitrators were
on panels of Ad Hoc committees for annulment proceedings.
Arbitrators from South America made up five percent of the
panels of initial case submissions. South Americans were
appointed presidents of six tribunals, roughly ten percent. Three
South American arbitrators were on panels of Ad Hoc committees
for annulment proceedings
Arbitrators from the Australia region made up three percent of
the panels of initial case submissions. Arbitrators from the
Australia region headed two tribunals, one as president and one as
sole arbitrator (CDC Group v. Republic of Seychelles
(ARB/02/14)). 158 Two arbitrators from the Australia region were
on panels of Ad Hoc committees for annulment proceedings.
Arbitrators from Asia and the Middle East made up three
percent of the panels of initial case submissions. An arbitrator
from the Asia/Middle East region was appointed president of one
tribunal. Three arbitrators from Asia and the Middle East were on
panels of Ad Hoc committees for annulment proceedings and one
was appointed president of the Ad Hoc committee. The following
chart demonstrates these statistics.
158 For a breakdown of the arbitrators in this case, see List of Concluded Cases:
107. CDC Group plc v. Republic of Seycehelles (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/14), ICSID,
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=GenCaseDtlsRH
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4.2. Counsel Nationality
The nationality of counsel representing the African states in
these proceedings is provided in thirty-two of sixty-four cases.
While in sixteen percent and twenty-two percent of these cases, the
respondent states were represented by exclusively African and
exclusively European counsel respectively, in the great majority of
cases-i.e., sixty-two percent of the cases-the African states were
represented by counsels composed of different nationalities
including the specific African respondent state, European,
American, and Australian.
5932014]
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Figure 2
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4.3. Claimant Nationality
In forty-two of the sixty-four cases, the publicly available data
provides the nationality of the claimants. The majority of the
claimants were from Europe, i.e., fifty-five percent with an
additional ten percent representing a joint venture of European
and North American investors. In an additional nineteen percent
of the cases, European investors collaborated with African
investors, and in seven percent of the cases North American
investors collaborated with African investors. Only five percent






The location of the arbitration (meaning the location of the
actual hearing) is indicated in thirty-eight of the sixty-four cases.
In eighty-five percent of the initial case submissions, hearings took
place in Europe exclusively with an additional thirteen percent of
the initial case submissions holding hearings in Europe along with
another location. North America was the hearing location for two
percent of the initial case submissions. No case was heard in
Africa.
Claimant Nationality
-1-r - on-- W 2t64-
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Sa-ple size = the 38 of 64 concluded caes from ICSIDwebsite with available information on hearing location
The data is thus unambiguous: African states routinely
arbitrate cases with private investors almost exclusively in
Washington, D.C., Paris, or London before three Western
arbitrators and represented by Western law firms. They obviously
spend a lot of money. What is the nature of the justice that they
buy in Washington, Paris, or London?
4.5. Outcome on Jurisdiction
Outcome on jurisdictional challenges is indicated in thirty-
seven of the sixty-four cases. A basis for jurisdiction was found in
seventy-four percent of the cases, while thirteen percent of the
cases found no basis for jurisdiction. Mixed outcomes on





4.6. Outcome on the Merits
Outcome on the merits of the case is indicated in thirty-four of
the sixty-four cases. In forty-four percent of the cases, investor
claims were rejected, while forty-one percent of the cases found the
respondent state liable. Another fifteen percent of the cases had a
mixed outcome. As shown in the following chart, the outcome on
the merits is fairly balanced.
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4.7. Allocation of Cost
Cost allocation is indicated in thirty-four of the sixty-four cases.
In all but seven cases, the cost was split, i.e., each party was
required to cover its own expenses and pay half of the costs of the
tribunal. In six of the remaining seven cases, the respondent state
was required to pay all or some parts of the claimant's costs. In
one case the parties were required to pay their own expenses, but
the respondent state was required to pay tribunal's costs, but that
was included in the split category in the chart below. The investor-
claimant was required to pay the respondent state's costs in only
one case.
Outcome on the Merits




5. THE VIRTUES OF ARISTOCRATIC JUSTICE
The study described above shows that in the last half-century,
African states defended investment claims in Europe and the
United States, and prevailed on the merits in about half of the
cases. The data also shows that ICSID tribunals found jurisdiction
in the overwhelming majority of cases. It also shows that no
matter who prevailed, the tribunals allocated costs evenly in the
great majority of cases and awarded costs to the respondent state
in only one case. This obviously paints a more complicated picture
and invites deeper inquiry; the following sections make such
attempt.
5.1. Who Are the "Virtuous" Men?
In their groundbreaking work, Dealing in Virtue, Professors
Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth equate virtue with "symbolic
capital":
Only a very select and elite group of individuals is able to
serve as international arbitrators. They are purportedly
selected for their 'virtue' -judgment, neutrality,
expertise -yet rewarded as if they are participants in
international deal making. In more sociological terms, the
symbolic capital acquired through a career of public service
Samplesize: Concludedcasesfrom iCSID websitewith vailable informationoncostallocation; 34of 64cases
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or scholarship is translated into a substantial cash value in
international arbitration. 159
They state that this "symbolic capital" can be arbitrarily
acquired160 and go on to make a historical comparison:
The careers of these noble individuals recall accounts of the
medieval church. The son of a nobleman could become a
bishop of the church simply because of family background
and social prominence. Others would shave their heads,
take vows of celibacy, devote everything to the church, and
yet have no chance to rise to a position of eminence, such as
bishop. Their hard work would help maintain the
institutional structure that made the position of bishop
attractive to the son of a nobleman, but they lacked the
social platform to gain the top position.161
So how is this related to a career in arbitration? They continue
to write:
There is similar phenomenon in arbitration. Without a
suitable platform, defined now as more than social class
(which is nevertheless useful), the arbitration devotee can
never get selected as an arbitrator. There are individuals
who, for example, teach at low-prestige schools, work in
unknown law firms, or produce scholarship that is deemed
to be too marginal, who cannot gain access to this world no
matter how much they write, attend conferences, or in
general profess the faith. Others need not even profess the
faith or write about arbitration to enter the field more or
less at the top.162
So, who are these noble men? A generic description of their
qualifications may read something like "academic standing,
scholarly publication, particular kinds of practical experience,
training in alternative dispute resolution, connections to business,
connections to political power, particular language skills, [and]
159 YvEs DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL
ORDER 8 (1996).
16o Id. at 18.




proficiency in technical aspects of arbitration practice." 63 More
importantly, "the weight of different agents depends on their
symbolic capital, i.e., on the recognition, institutionalized or not,
that they receive from a group." 64
Consider the "five-million-pound man," Swiss arbitrator Pierre
Lalive.165 The media report exaggerated the fee he charged in the
Westland case. It was not quite five-million pounds, but rather
4,697,258 British Pounds.166 Lalive's judgment may or may not be
worth that much, similar to many professional services that
consumers purchase on the marketplace,167 but Dezalay and Garth
use his career path to exemplify what it takes to join the aristocratic
club: together with his renowned older brother, Lalive is a partner
at the Lalive Law firm in Geneva; has written many books and
articles; possessed an academic appointment in Geneva; taught at
Columbia, Cambridge, the University of Brussels, and the Hague
Academy of International Law; and served as president of the
ICC's Institute of Business Law and Practice, a member of the
London Court of International Arbitration, and president of the
Swiss Arbitration Association.168
Although the arbitration field is still dominated by persons of
this caliber, today's career path is probably more like Jan
Paulsson's, whom Dezalay and Garth say is "the closest equivalent
in his generation to Pierre Lalive of the older generation."169
Consider Paulsson's ticket to prominence: multi-cultural
upbringing (a son of Swedish missionaries, and grew up in
Liberia), excellent academic credentials (Harvard College and Yale
Law), early practice exposure to international arbitration, sustained
163 Id. at 19.
164 Id. at 18 (quoting PIERRE BOURDIEU & Loic J. D. WACQUANT, AN INVITATION
TO REFLEXIVE SOCIOLOGY 119 (1992)) (emphasis omitted).
165 Id. at 19 n.3 (citing Jeremy Edwards, The Five-Million Pound Man, LEGAL
BUSINESS, Nov. 1994, at 46-49). Lalive obtained such a large fee from the Westland
Helicopters Ltd. v. Arab Organisations for Industrialisation case involving hundreds of
millions. For a discussion of this case, see Justice Colman, Westland Helicopters Ltd
v. Arab Organisations for Industrialisation, 10 ARAB L. Q. 115-43 (1995).
166 DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 159, at 19 n.3.
167 Note the similarity of this with the recent debate on Wall Street executive
compensation. See Frank Ahrens, Isn't That Rich? The Bonus Controversy of 2009,
WASH. POST, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/opinions/
outlook-bonus/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2014) (compiling opinions of politicians and
chief executives on the fairness of Wall Street bonuses).
168 DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 159, at 20.
169 Id. at 24.
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high-quality scholarly production and a great platform as a partner
at one of the world's most prominent international arbitration
firms, and as a professor at an American law school. 170 Everything
is just right. That is how the virtue is acquired and maintained.
Indeed, to use Professor Salacuse's characterization, these experts
are members of an "epistemic community" with the ability to
influence policy and shape jurisprudence.171
5.2. Why Do the Africans Appoint the Virtuous Men?
Simply stated, these men are evidently appointed because of
their virtue. Africa is certainly under no obligation to appoint
them as arbitrators or counsel. Consider this true statement:
Overall, who the arbitrator is in terms of expertise and prior
experience is the most important single factor in both the
decisional and the consensus processes. Who he or she is
determines the availability of both substantive and fact
finding norms, conditions the procedural and role norms
that are held, and raises or lowers the degree of influence in
interaction with other arbitrators.1 72
This is often expressed -similar to the well-known real estate
maxim - as "arbitrator, arbitrator, arbitrator." 173
170 Id. For Paulsson's current biography, see also Governing Board, ICCA,
http://www.arbitration-icca.org/about/governing-board/President/Jan
Paulsson.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2014).
171 Salacuse, supra note 3, at 465-67 (noting that "[s]ince the movement to
negotiate investment treaties began, the epistemic community of international
lawyers, scholars, jurists, and arbitrators has, through their advising, writing,
advocacy, and judicial, and arbitral decisions, shaped the regime" of international
investment," and noting further that to the extent there is coherence in the regime,
it could be attributed to the similarity in the backgrounds of the members of the
epistemic community who are mainly Western). Salacuse cites to the ICSID
database which shows forty-three percent of arbitrators appointed so far being
from only five countries, the United States (120), France (106), Britain (94), Canada
(75), and Switzerland (70). Id. at 467 n.191 and accompanying text. Salacuse
concludes that "arbitrators are very much a part of an international epistemic
community with similar training and, in many cases, comparable background."
Id. at 467.
172 DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 159, at 8 n.6 (citing Mentschikoff &
Haggard, Decision Making and Decision Consensus in Commercial Arbitration, in LAW,
JUSTICE, AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN SOCIETY: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES 295, 307
(June Louin Tapp & Felice J. Levine eds., 1977)).
173 William W. Park, Arbitrator Integrity, in THE BACKLASH AGAINST
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION, supra note 38, at 189, 191 n.4.
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Why do they nominate Queen's Counsel, Sir Ian Brownlie,174 if
the opposing party picks Queen's Counsel Sir Elihu
Lauterpacht?1 75 If the judge is Lalive, why does the respondent
African state choose to hire Paulsson as counsel? If the system is
manned by virtuous men of this stature, what options do the
Africans have? What sustains the imbalance is simply put as a race
to the top. There is no doubt that these learned men bring prestige
and produce high quality jurisprudence, but does it necessarily
mean that their appointment improves the quality of the justice
that the African states receive? Or are the Africans perpetually
defending themselves using everything in their arsenal? What is
the nature of the justice that emerges out of this process?176 The
case studies provided in the next section will help shed some light.
174 Sir Ian Brownlie is one of the most recognizable names in the area of
international law. Before his death in Cairo at age seventy-seven, for over a
period of twenty-five years, he appeared before the International Court of Justice
in more than forty contentious cases. Philippe Sands, Sir Ian Brownlie Obituary,
THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 11, 2010, 1:02 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/
theguardian/2010/jan/11/sir-ian-brownlie-obituary. He had "a formidable
reputation for integrity and independence." Id. His book, Principles of Public
International Law, now in its eighth edition, is one of the most widely used
treatises in the world. It has been translated into several languages including
Chinese, Japanese and Russian. "Almost every international lawyer and judge
has referred to this classic text." Id.
175 Sir Lauterpacht is a prominent jurist with extensive experience as an
advocate, adviser, arbitrator, and judge in many different forums involving such
areas of the law as natural resources law, investment matters, expropriation,
territorial and boundary problems, maritime delimitation, fisheries, and
environmental issues. High profile International Court of Justice cases in which
he was involved include the Nottebohm case, the North Sea Continental Shelf cases,
the Barcelona Traction case, the Nuclear Tests cases, Pakistan v. India Aerial Incident
case, El Salvador v. Honduras, Kasikili case, Qatar v. Bahrain, Malaysia/Indonesia
(Sipadan and Ligitan) case, and the Avena case (Mexico v. US). Arbitral tribunal
cases include: Chile/Argentina boundary disputes, the Egypt/Israel Taba
arbitration, the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, ICSID, etc. He was adviser on
international law to the British Central Policy Review Staff, 1972-1974 and 1978-
1980. He also served as an ad hoc Judge of the ICJ in the Bosnia v. Yugoslavia case
(1993-2001), a member and President of the World Bank Administrative Tribunal,
Chairman of the Asian Development Bank Administrative Tribunal, Chairman of
the East African Common Market Tribunal, 1972-1975, a Presiding Commissioner
of the UN Compensation Commission, an arbitrator in various World Bank
(ICSID) and President of the Eritrea/ Ethiopia Boundary Commission. His
academic achievements are also equally impressive. For Sir Lauterpacht's full
biography, see Sir Elihu Lauterpacht CBE QC LLD, 20 ESSEX STREET http://www.
20essexst.com/member/sir-elihu-lauterpacht (last visited Mar. 4, 2014).
176 See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 159, at 9 ("The operation of the market
in the selection of arbitrators therefore provides a key to understanding the justice
that emerges from the decisions of arbitrators.").
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5.2.1. Case Study
Consider the following three statements on the state of a
particular aspect of the law of international investment:
"There are few if any issues in international law today on which
opinion seems to be so divided as the limitations on a state's power to
expropriate the property of aliens."177
- Supreme Court of the United States, 1964
"[Als a matter of general international law, a non-discriminatory
regulation for a public purpose, which is enacted in accordance with
due process and, which affects, inter alios [sic], a foreign investor or
investment is not deemed expropriatory and compensable unless
specific commitments had been given by the regulating government to
the then putative foreign investor contemplating investment that the
government would refrain from such regulation. "178
- NAFTA Tribunal, 2005
"'[Tihe obligation . . . not to nationalize . . . without fair
compensation' . . . [constitutes] one of the generally recognized principles
of international law."179 [Hence, full fair market value is appropriate
compensation.]180
-ICSID Tribunal, 1980
The arbitral process is riddled with complications flowing from
legal uncertainty and fact-finding problems inherent in the law,
notwithstanding the presence of competent counsel and
arbitrators. For African states, this problem is compounded by the
serious cultural barriers they face in not only commanding
audience before the virtuous men but also in communicating with
their own counsels. In order to contextualize these problems and
assess the nature of justice received by the African states, three case
17 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964).
178 Methanex Corp. v. United States, Final Award of the Tribunal on
Jurisdiction and Merits, 44 I.L.M. 1345, 1456 pt. IV, ch. D, 7 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb.
Trib. 2005), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/51052.
pdf.
179 Benvenuti & Bonfant v. Government of the People's Republic of Congo,
ICSID Case No. ARB/77/2, Award, 4.63-4.64 (Aug. 8, 1980), 1 ICSID Rep. 330
(1993) (quoting Defense Memorial, People's Republic of Congo, at 5).
180 Id. f 4.73-4.79. This statement is my summation on this section.
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studies are provided below. The purpose of this discussion is to
illustrate typical factual and legal issues that arise and their
resolution. Case samples were selected for demonstrative
purposes only. The single most important selection criterion was
the availability of a decision on the merits in English.
Before the selected cases are discussed, it is important to
outline the basic framework for the constitution of arbitral
tribunals under ICSID. At the most rudimentary level, the legal
framework for the constitution of an ICSID tribunal is set forth
under Articles 37 through 40 of the ICSID Convention.181 The
party who wants to initiate an arbitration must first submit a
request to the Secretary General of the Centre. If the request is not
"manifestly" outside the jurisdiction of ICSID,182 the Secretary
General registers the case, notifies the respondent and facilitates
the constitution of the tribunal as soon as possible.183 The parties
appoint either a sole or an uneven number of arbitrators.184 If a
party or the parties fail to appoint an arbitrator or arbitrators, the
Convention gives the Chairman of the Administrative Council,185
who is the President of the World Bank,18 6 the authority to make
the necessary appointments.187 Ordinarily, the arbitrators are
181 ICSID Convention, supra note 4, at arts. 37-40.
182 See ICSID Convention, supra note 4, at art. 36 ("(1) Any Contracting State
or any national of a Contracting State wishing to institute arbitration proceedings
shall address a request to the effect in writing to the Secretary-General who shall
send a copy of the request to the other party. (2) The request shall contain
information concerning the issues in dispute, the identity of the parties and their
consent to arbitration in accordance with the rules of procedure for the institution
of conciliation and arbitration proceedings. (3) The Secretary-General shall
register the request unless he finds, on the basis of the information contained in
the request, that the dispute is manifestly outside the jurisdiction of the Centre.
He shall forthwith notify the parties of registration or refusal to register.").
183 Id. at art. 37(1).
184 Id. at art. 37(2). For a detailed description of these provisions, see
SCHREUER, supra note 4, at 475-89.
185 The Administrative Council is composed of one representative of each
Contracting State. ICSID Convention, supra note 4, at art. 4(1).
186 Id. at art. 5 ("The President of the Bank shall be ex officio Chairman of the
Administrative Council.
187 Id. at art. 38 ("If the Tribunal shall not have been constituted within 90
days after notice of registration of the request has been dispatched by the
Secretary-General .. . or such other period as the parties may agree, the Chairman
shall, at the request of either party and after consultation with both parties as far
as possible, appoint the arbitrator or arbitrators not yet appointed."). For a
detailed description of these provisions, see SCHREUER, supra note 4, at 490-97. He
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appointed from the Panel of Arbitrators. 88 The Panel is composed
of arbitrators nominated by Contracting States and those
nominated by the Chair of the Administrative Council. The
Convention gives Contracting States the opportunity to nominate
up to four arbitrators and the Chair to nominate ten arbitrators.
The Convention allows the Contracting States to nominate persons
who are not their nationals, but requires the Chair to appoint
persons of different nationalities.189 Although the disputing parties
have the right to make appointments outside of the Panel, the
Chair's choice is limited to the Panel when she exercises her default
appointment authority under Article 38.190
With this background on the constitution of ICSID tribunals,
the following case studies identify the identity of the arbitrators
and parties and their counsel, the place of arbitration, the factual
and legal issues addressed, the outcome of the merits and the
allocation of cost, followed by brief commentary on the nature of
justice that emerge out of these cases.
Case Study No. 1: Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Limited (Claimant)
v. United Republic of Tanzania (Respondent)191
This case, in many ways, is a quintessential investment
arbitration involving an African state. The Arbitral Tribunal was
composed of Mr. Gary Born, a national of the United States,
appointed by the claimant; Mr. Toby Landau, a national of the
United Kingdom, appointed by the respondent; and Mr. Bernard
Hanotiau, a national of Belgium, appointed as president of the
tribunal by the party-selected arbitrators.192  The award was
rendered on July 24, 2008 and contains a 242 page majority opinion
and a 10 page dissenting and concurring opinion by Mr. Gary
Born. The claimant, Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. (BGT), was
notes that "Art. 38 is the most important Article designed to safeguard the
principle of non-frustration in the constitution of the tribunal." Id. at 490.
1as ICSID Convention, supra note 4, at art. 40(1).
189 Id. at art. 13(2). For a discussion of these provisions, see SCHREUER, supra
note 4, at 45-47.
190 ICSID Convention, supra note 4, at art. 40(1-2). For a detailed discussion
of these provisions and bibliography, see SCHREUER, supra note 4, at 507-15.
191 Biwater Gauff (Tanz.) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case
No. ARB/05/22, Award (Jul. 24, 2008), available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/
ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC158
9_En&caseld=C67.
192 Id. T 25-27.
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represented by counsels from the London office of Allen & Overy
LLP, including Judith Gill, Matthew Gearing, Hannah Ambrose,
Michelle de Kluyver, Autumn Ellis and Andrew Pullen.193 The
respondent state, Tanzania, was represented by a team of lawyers
from Freshfields-consisting of Jan Paulsson, D. Brian King,
Jonathan J. Gass, Marijn Heemskerk -along with attorneys from
Tanzanian Attorney-General's Chambers, including Julius Mallaba,
and the Tanzanian law firm of Mkono & Co.194 The proceeding
took place at both the World Bank's office in Paris1 95 and
Freshfields' office in London.196
In 2003, the World Bank, the European Investment Bank, and
the African Development Bank awarded the Republic of Tanzania
USD $140,000,000 for the purpose of repairing, upgrading, and
extending the water supply and sewer infrastructure of its capital
city, Dar es Salaam.197 As the tribunal put it, "[a]s a condition of
the funding, the Republic was obliged to appoint a private
operator to manage and operate the water and sewerage system,
and to carry out some of the works associated with the Project." 198
A lengthy bid process resulted in the selection of the claimant,
Biwater, a joint venture of a UK corporation and a German
corporation, with 80-20 shares respectively 99 Because the foreign
company was required to involve a local Tanzanian company, it
selected STM, and they jointly incorporated "City Water," with
Biwater as the majority shareholder and STM as the minority
shareholder.200 City Water signed three contracts - collectively
called the Project Contract-with the Dar es Salaam Water and
Sewerage Authority (DAWASA): the Water and Sewerage Lease
Contract, the Supply and Installation of Plant and Equipment
Contract and the Contract for the Procurement of Goods.201 The
Republic-as represented by DAWASA, a parastatal corporation
established under Tanzanian law -is listed as a party solely in the









201 Id. 1 6.
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DAWASA as parties. 202 Under the Lease Contract-the main
subject of the dispute-City Water assumed the responsibilities
from DAWASA to manage the water and sewerage operations, and
also undertook the responsibility of designing and expanding the
system while collecting revenue from customers for an initial
period of ten years. 203 A complex mix of circumstances with roots
in the initial bidding process led to a serious failure of the
enterprise.204 The dispute essentially pertained to the allocation of
blame for the failure. According to the tribunal, almost every
aspect of the business relationship was disputed; however, one
thing was unusually clear-that the alleged expropriation or
actions taken by the government caused no economic damage to
the investor because the enterprise was not profitable from the
very beginning.205 In fact, it was allegedly an "opportunistic" bid
that sought to renegotiate the terms after the contract had been
awarded.206
The tribunal found that the cumulative effect of the Tanzanian
Government's measures amounted to indirect expropriation,
although no economic damage was caused.207 The factual findings
of the tribunal include that the bid was poorly prepared; the
project encountered problems almost as soon as it began; it
immediately became clear that the enterprise would not work
absent a renegotiation; renegotiations failed and the contract was
terminated by DAWASA. 208
In the process of terminating the contract, the Republic did
certain things that rubbed the arbitrators the wrong way. The
responsible minister gave a press statement about the termination
of the contract (apparently he was running for Prime Minster), the
Government withdrew some value added tax exemptions that they
had promised, occupied City Water's facilities and took over
management, and finally arrested and deported the staff to
Britain.209 On the basis of this, the Tribunal finally found that






207 Id. 461, 485.
208 Id. 486.
209 Id. TT 497-518.
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termination of the Lease Contract at this time was inevitable, and
was going to materialise within . . . weeks . .. these circumstances
cannot avoid the conclusion that an expropriation of BGT's
contractual and property rights took place." 210 The Tribunal put
the theoretical justification as follows:
[W]hilst accepting that the effects of a certain severity must
be shown to qualify an act as expropriatory, there is
nothing to require that such effects be economic in nature.
A distinction must be drawn between (a) interference with
rights and (b) economic loss. A substantial interference with
rights may well occur without actually causing any
economic damage which can be quantified in terms of due
compensation. 211
Hence, "the absence of economic loss or damage is primarily a
matter of causation and quantum-rather than a necessary
ingredient in the cause of action of expropriation itself." 212 Because
none of the Republic's actions caused any economic damages to
the investor, the Tribunal's remedy was declaratory in nature. 213
However, the finding of non-compensable fault on the part of the
Republic allowed the Tribunal to allocate the cost of the
proceeding equally and allow the parties cover their own
expenses. 214
Several observations could be made here. The Tribunal had no
difficulty in determining material facts. It quickly became clear
that the project was a failed enterprise from its inception. The
Republic had at least two reasons to involve the investor-it was
required by the World Bank, which provided the funding, and it
believed that the investor would have the resources and the
expertise to carry out the project. When it did not work, the
Republic took dramatic measures that an ordinary contracting
party would not take, including detaining and deporting company
executives. Although this caused no ascertainable economic
damage to the investment, the Tribunal held that it was "the straw
210 Id. 518.
211 Id. 464.
212 Id. 1 465. To be sure, as the Tribunal put it, "the 'fair market value' of City
Water at the date of the expropriation, 1 June 2005, was nil." Id. 797.
213 Id. 1 807.
214 Id. T 812-13.
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that [broke] the camel's back."215 Ill-advised as they might have
been, it is not inconceivable that a differently constituted arbitral
tribunal might alternatively view the actions as detached sovereign
actions, which may be remedied through diplomatic means. The
Tribunal did indeed sit in judgment of the acceptable levels of
government misconduct in absolute terms. These findings are not
surprising at all if the identity of the government in question and
the nationalities of the mistreated officials played a role in the
decision making process. More importantly, the finding of an
actionable fault on the part of the Republic offered a legal basis for
the allocation of cost.
Apart from its own unwise - perhaps politically motivated -
behavior, the African state came out of the arbitration a total loser
in many ways. When it took the money from the World Bank, it
was required to hire a foreign investor. It picked one that was not
up to the task for various reasons. The enterprise failed, nearly
jeopardizing the water supply of its capital city. It then submitted
to international arbitration and selected a learned arbitrator who
was apparently offended by the government's erratic behavior. As
a result, it ended up paying a large amount of money for basically
winning the case. If signing the BITs and submitting to
international arbitration was supposed to attract investors, it is
difficult to see how this could help the Tanzanian Republic attract
more investors. In any case, although the award is supported by
detailed analysis and highly sophisticated reasoning, the value of
such sophistication to the respondent state is a question worth
asking.
Case Study No. 2: Helnan International Hotels A/S v. The Arab
Republic of Egypt (ICSID Case No. 05/19)216
The Tribunal was composed of Mr. Yves Derains, a citizen of
France, as Chairman; Professor Rudolf Dolzer, a citizen of
Germany, appointed by the respondent; and Mr. Michael Lee, a
citizen of Britain, appointed by the claimant.217 The claimant is
215 Id. 456 (quoting Seimens v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/8, Award, 1 263 (Feb. 6, 2007)).
216 Helnan Int'l Hotels A/S v. The Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No.






Helnan International Hotels, a Danish company. It was
represented by several attorneys from the London office of Baker
Botts. The respondent, the Arab Republic of Egypt ("Egypt") was
represented by Professor Jan Paulsson of Freshfields and several
Egyptian counsels including Dr. Mohamed Abdel Raouf.218 The
arbitration was conducted in Paris.219
On September 8, 1986, Helnan entered into a management
contract with the Egyptian Organization for Tourism (EGOTH) to
manage the Cairo Shepheard Hotel, which EGOTH owned. 220
While the initial contract was for a period of twenty-six years, a
subsequent amendment permitted EGOTH to sell the hotel and
granted Helnan the option of continuing to manage or terminate
the management contract in exchange for adequate
compensation.22 '
In 2003, the Ministry of Tourism downgraded the Shepheard
from a five-star to a four-star hotel because of unsatisfactory
inspection results.222 The downgrade prompted EGOTH to seek
the termination of the management contract on grounds of
impossibility of performance because the management contract
required Helnan to run the hotel as a five-star.223 An arbitral
tribunal constituted for that purpose in Cairo did exactly that -
while awarding Helnan 12.5 million Egyptian pounds for the
settlement of debts that it owed in connection with the
performance of the management contract.224 EGOTH paid Helnan
the 12.5 million EGP and the Egyptian courts then enforced the
award by evicting Helnan and allowing EGOTH to take over. 22 5
Based on the BIT between Egypt and Denmark signed in 1999,
Helnan initiated this ICSID arbitration. Helnan alleged that
EGOTH improperly conspired with the Egyptian Ministry of
Tourism to solicit the downgrading of the hotel so that it could sell
the hotel unencumbered by the management contract. 226 These
measures, Helnan argued, amounted to expropriation and violated
218 Id. 1 2.
219 Id. TT 14, 45.
220 Id. T 3.
221 Id.
222 Id. $5.
223 Id. T 6.
224 Id.
225 Id. TT 7-8.
226 Id. TT 58-63.
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many provisions of the BIT, including non-discrimination, as well
as fair and equitable treatment. 227 Helnan also made several
factual allegations and adduced evidence to prove the allegations.
Perhaps the most important question for the tribunal was
whether the downgrade was improperly solicited so that Egypt
could privatize the hotel unencumbered by the management
contract. 228 Helnan made at least three factual allegations that it
said would prove a conspiracy: (1) on June 14, 2003, the Ministry
of Tourism conducted an inspection and issued a harsh report; (2)
without giving Helnan enough time to cure the problems, the
Ministry conducted another inspection on September 4, 2003, filed
its report the same day,229 and three days later, on September 7,
2003, the Ministry downgraded the hotel from five-star to four-
star;230 (3) just twenty-five days later, EGOTH initiated an
arbitration proceeding in Cairo for the termination of the
contract-suggesting prior knowledge of the downgrade. 231 These
facts collectively show the existence of a collusion to eject Helnan.
These facts prove indirect expropriation.232
To prove the conspiracy, Helnan called its own witness and
presented circumstantial evidence regarding the timing of the
inspections and the subsequent decision to downgrade.233 It also
relied on testimony of an Egyptian witness elicited through cross-
examination.234 The Tribunal found the hastiness of the two
inspections and the immediate decision to downgrade suspicious,
but the Tribunal's finding of collusion seems to critically rely on
the testimony of EGOTH's in-house counsel, who said that her
department knew about the downgrade approximately sixty days
prior to the commencement of the arbitral proceeding.235
The in-house counsel's testimony was so important to the
outcome of the decision that the Tribunal reproduced it in part.
The excerpt of the cross-examination reads:
227 Id. 50-53.




232 Id. TT 135-36.
233 Id. TT 64-79.
234 Id. TT 58-64.
235 Id. T 154.
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Q. When did you first learn of the downgrade of the
Shepheard Hotel?
A. Before initiating the procedures for the arbitration by a
very, very short time. Approximately 60 days before.
Q. I'm sorry, you learned of the downgrade 60 days before
initiating the arbitration?
A. Approximately, yes.23 6
During redirect, the in-house counsel, Mrs. Dorreya Refaat,
retracted the testimony, saying that she was mistaken in her
estimate, but the Tribunal did not believe her, noting her retraction
"was far from . .. convincing." 237 It then held that "the Arbitral
tribunal is satisfied that EGOTH and various Egyptian authorities,
including the ministry of Tourism, played a significant role in the
implementation of a plan aiming at terminating the Management
contract."238 Finally, however, the Tribunal held that Helnan failed
to prove that the Egyptian state did indeed adopt these measures
to get rid of Helnan in order to privatize the hotel.239 The only
evidence that Helnan submitted to this effect was an affidavit by
Mr. Bahi Nasr, the former chair of the Egyptian Hotels Company,
the predecessor of EGOTH.240 Nasr stated that the former
undersecretary of the Ministry of Tourism told him there was an
order to downgrade the Shepheard hotel and terminate the
management contract so that it could be privatized. 241 However,
when Mr. Nasr appeared before the Tribunal to offer testimony, he
claimed he could not recall the particular conversation, but
suspected that might have been the plan. Unimpressed with the
testimony, the Tribunal totally discounted the statement.242
Some very interesting observations can be made about the
Tribunal's handling of the proceedings. First, it appears that the
Tribunal discounted all oral testimonies offered by Egyptian
witnesses on both sides, instead relying exclusively on
circumstantial evidence and inferences. It is difficult to determine
236 Id.







U. Pa. J. Int'l L.
if a cultural miscommunication between an all-male European
tribunal and one female and one male Egyptian witness who
testified under cross examination administered by experienced,
mostly European or American counsel in Paris played any role at
all in the decision. But it is a fair question to ask. Second, having
convinced itself that a conspiracy existed using mainly
circumstantial evidence, the Tribunal shied away from attributing
that conspiracy to the state. Finally, the Tribunal allocated cost
equally, as is often done when the investor loses.24 3 It required
each party to cover its own expenses and share the costs of the
proceedings. 244 Some finding of fault on the part of the state is
often perceived to be necessary to such allocation of costs. 24 5
Although the Tribunal noted that it allocated costs this way
because of the claimant's win on jurisdiction and admissibility,246 it
is more likely that the Tribunal's finding of the conspiracy was the
basis for the equal allocation of cost. This is because winning on
jurisdiction and inadmissibility is inconsequential if the merits are
lost because this only allows a party to present a claim. Ultimately,
however, it is clear that the State is the loser in many ways because
it had to defend a claim and pay the expenses. It is unnecessary to
ask the question of how an all-African tribunal might rule in this
case because such a tribunal had already ruled on the related claim
of termination in the Cairo arbitration.247 It is quite notable that the
European company Helnan actually appointed an Egyptian
arbitrator, Dr. Abdel Wahab, in the Cairo arbitration, although it
later accused him of bias in favor of EGOTH.248 Again, the
Tribunal's analysis was highly sophisticated, but at the end of the
day, the value of such sophistication and the fairness of the results
might be questioned.
243 See supra Section 4.7 (discussing data related to the allocation of costs
among parties in ICSID arbitrations).
244 Id. 171-74.
245 See supra Sections 4.6 and 4.7 (analyzing and depicting data related to
outcomes on the merits and allocation of costs).
246 Id. 173.
247 Id. 150, 162.
248 Id. T 164.
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Case Study No. 3: Gustav F WHamester GmbH & Co KG v.
Republic of Ghana (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/24)249
The claimant in this case is Hamester, a German company. The
respondent is the Republic of Ghana. The claim was based on a
Germany-Ghana BIT.250 The arbitrators in this case were Professor
Brigitte Stern, a French national and President of the tribunal, Dr.
Bernardo M. Cremades, a Spanish national appointed by the
claimant, and Mr. Toby Landau Q.C., a British national appointed
by the respondent.251 Both parties were represented by attorneys
based in London, and the proceedings took place in London as
well.252
The facts of this case are complex. For purposes of this
analysis, it is sufficient to state that Hamester signed a joint
venture agreement (JVA) with a Ghanaian public enterprise called
Cocobod.253 The principal function of Cocobod is to buy cocoa
beans from farmers for marketing and export, and the purpose of
the joint venture with Hamester was to upgrade and modernize an
old cocoa processing factory and share the profits in a mutually
agreed proportion.254 Hamester and Cocobod (as a minority
shareholder) incorporated a company called Wamco for this
purpose. 255 After the upgrading work was completed, they agreed
that the entirety of the output would be sold to Hamester, but they
did not fix the price in writing at that time. 256 A few years later,
Wamco became indebted to Cocobod for failing to pay for
deliveries that it had taken.257 While the parties did not dispute
that fact, Hamester denied that it was responsible for the debt,
blaming it on failure to agree on price.258 Subsequently, the two
sides made several attempts to agree on pricing, and eventually
signed a price agreement. However, Hamester later alleged that it
249 Gustav F W Hamester GmbH & Co KG v. Republic of Ghana, ICSID Case
No. ARB/07/24, Award (une 18, 2010), available at http://www.italaw.
com/ sites/default/files/case-documents/ ita0396.pdf.
250 Id. 11.
251 Id. T 8.
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signed this agreement under duress.259 In a related development,
shortly after signing the price agreement, Cocobod failed to supply
the required quantity of cocoa beans, blaming its failure on
smuggling activities and outbreak of disease.260  Hamester
considered Cocobod's failure to supply the cocoa as a breach of
their contract. 261  After many efforts to renegotiate the price,
Hamester abandoned the JVC and its managing director left
Ghana. 262
The parties disputed all of the facts including: whether the
price agreement was made under duress, whether the failure to
supply the required amount of cocoa constituted a breach of
contract, and who owed Cocobod money, Hamester or the joint
company Wamco.263 The parties also disputed the circumstances
that led to the managing director's departure; while the managing
director alleged that he feared for his own and his family's safety,
Ghana suspected fraud and opened a police investigation.264
Related to the departure of the manager, Cocobod's General
Manager of Operations, who was also a minority shareholder of
Wamco, ordered the suspension of exports altogether.265 The
sequence of the events, as well as the responsibility for each action,
was disputed.266
Hamester alleged that Cocobod's actions collectively breached
Ghana's treaty obligations, including the principles of fair and
equitable treatment and non-discrimination amounting to
expropriation.267 The respondent claimed that Hamester was a
fraudulent partner from the very beginning, and that Hamester
failed to make a bona fide investment. 268 It further alleged that
Hamester and its managing director defrauded Wamco throughout
the JVC.269 Alternatively, even if Wamco was responsible for any




262 Id. TT 44-67.
263 Id. T 205-211, 257-262, 269-276.
264 Id. T 55-57.
265 Id. 53, 269.
266 Id. TT 269-300.
267 Id. TT 68-79.
268 Id. 80-81.
269 Id. T 81.
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did not rise to the level of breach of treaty obligation.270 Without
the need to determine each disputed fact, the Tribunal, after a
lengthy legal analysis, decided that none of the alleged acts of
breach were attributable to Ghana.271 It held, in particular, that a
breach of contract does not ordinarily rise to a breach of treaty
obligation.272 However, the tribunal allocated the cost of the
proceedings equally and required each party to cover its own
expenses.273
Because this case rested largely on the legal question of
attribution, the factual inquiries were not remarkably detailed.
Most notably, however, Ghana had to go through the process of
defending itself against the German company for a failed business
dealing. If every possible form of breach of contract is framed in
the context of breach of a treaty obligation, the number of claims
that a state would have to defend against could be staggering.
Significantly, in this case, the Tribunal appears to be sensitive to
that possibility. It is probably not unreasonable to expect more
consistency in determining these kinds of legal questions as
compared to findings of facts, which tend to be more culturally
engrained because, at their core, they beg the uncomfortable
question of who is better understood or more credible. It is
interesting to observe that most, if not all, of the respondent's
witnesses seem to be Ghanaians, while the expert witness was
European.274 It is difficult to anticipate the possible outcome of this
case had the facts been important. But it is fair to assume it would
have been much more difficult for the Ghanaians to prove their
allegations, including bad faith ab initio and sustained fraud on the
part of the European business partner, before an all-European
tribunal.
6. ICSID's RELEVANCE FOR CHINA-AFRICA DISPUTES
As indicated in Section 1 above, Chinese investment in Africa
has surpassed European investment in many areas. This trend is
certain to continue. The investment is large by all standards.
270 Id. T 84-85.
271 Id. 171-312.
272 Id. 313-350.
273 Id. T T 359-361.
274 Id. 19 (listing the fact witnesses for Ghana as: Mr. Kwame Sapong, Dr.
Sammy Ohene, Mr. Flix Auaye, Mr. Isaac Osei, and Mr. Reinhold Mueller. The
expert witness was Mr. John Ellison.).
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Investment disputes are inevitable. Some large-scale disputes have
already arisen.275 To come back to the central question that this
article raises: would ICSID be an attractive forum for them? The
reality is that ICSID still has several advantages that make it
attractive. With some measures of adaptability, it could serve as a
good forum for the resolution of China-Africa or even more
broadly Asia-Africa investment disputes. This section attempts to
put the above discussions into perspective and outline some of the
measures of adaptability that need to be taken.
6.1. Matured Legal and Institutional Framework and Maturing
Jurisprudence
If the problems identified in this article, which are summarized
under subsection 5 below, are addressed, reinventing the wheel of
procedures and enforcement of investment awards, while ignoring
the body of emerging 'case law,' is probably an unnecessary step
for Africa and its new economic partners. As dubious as its
genesis might have been, the enforcement of an arbitral award, as
if it were the domestic court judgment of the state where it needs to
be enforced, is an innovative legal notion that most African states
and some Asian states, including China, have subscribed to for
various historical and practical reasons. 276  This method of
enforcement is worth preserving, assuming that the decisions are
rendered fairly and equitably in a manner that addresses the
deficiencies identified above and summarized below. It is also
unnecessary to ignore the maturing jurisprudence of international
investment law of the last half-century, much of which could be
attributed to ICSID tribunals.
6.2. Neutrality
One of the obvious advantages of ICSID, with its traditional
Western-centric attributes, is that it still enjoys the advantage of
275 See, e.g., Alyx Barker, Gabon Faces ICC Claim from Chinese Oil Producer,
GLOBAL ARB. REV., (March 19, 2013) http://www.globalarbitrationreview.
com/news/article/31421/ (reporting a claim for $300 million dollars by a
subsidiary of a Chinese oil and gas group against Gabon and the counterclaim for
double that amount).
276 See ICSID Convention, supra note 4, at art. 54(1) ("Each Contracting State
shall recognize an award rendered pursuant to this Convention as binding and
enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award within its territories as if
it were a final judgment of a court in that State.").
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neutrality in the Africa versus non-European-investor disputes.
Although the democracy deficit discussed above would still be an
issue, ironically, it does not carry the unfair imbalance that often
accompanies the resolution of disputes between a European
investor and an African state.
The most serious problem remains the cultural competence of
the members of the tribunal and counsel on both sides, and the
attendant cultural barriers faced by African and Asian parties. As
previously stated, the determination of complex facts is a deeply
cultural phenomenon that requires familiarity with the culture.
This could be addressed through a selection process that takes
cultural competence into account -regardless of the arbitrators'
home state.
6.3. Expertise
The law of international investment can be extremely complex,
as are the legal relationships that precipitate investment disputes.
Frequently, the scale of the economic relationship is also
enormous. The identification, interpretation, and proper
application of the law to the complex investment related factual
circumstances and the rendering of a just and acceptable award
almost always requires not only technical competence, exposure,
and experience, but also appropriate temperament and reputation.
Persons who serve on ICSID tribunals are often selected for these
qualities. Any system of investment arbitration cannot ignore such
expertise and reputation accumulated over a long period of time.
Since such expertise is largely non-African and non-Asian, a new
way of harnessing it must be considered, for example, consciously
diversifying each tribunal. An ideal tribunal would have members
from Africa and Asia, as well as Europe or other Western
countries.
6.4. Convenience
The European fora are geographically and otherwise most
convenient for disputes involving African states and Asian
investors. It must be acknowledged that such convenience is not
limited to the availability of matured institutions and facilities. For
a variety of historical reasons, Africans and Asians are both more
familiar with Europe than with each other. At the most basic level,
they often communicate using European languages. As such, the
convenience cannot be overstated. However, as indicated below,
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serious cultural barriers must be addressed for the convenience to
bear fruit.
6.5. Adaptability
Although ICSID has all of these advantages, to stay relevant for
Africa and its new economic partners, it must make a conscious
effort to address some of the problems identified in this article.
First and foremost, it must address the serious democracy deficit
that all indicators prove. In this day and age, any suggestion that
there are no qualified women and qualified African or Asian
arbitrators cannot be true. Traditional notions of justice demand
some level of proximity between the judge and the judged. In
modem times, elementary notions of legitimacy require some
diversity in the arbitrator pool. Despite some efforts, the result so
far has been disappointing. No matter how it is framed, what
sustains such aristocratic justice is a level of monopoly enabled by
ICSID and its World Bank roots and affiliation. At a time when the
World Bank is no longer the only or even the most important
source of financing for investment projects in Africa and
elsewhere, 277 the virtues of the existing system of justice will
become even more questionable. ICSID must take affirmative
steps to address the democracy deficit.
It may be argued that there is nothing that ICSID can do
because the parties themselves nominate the virtuous men to act as
arbitrators. For the sake of its own legitimacy, ICSID can lead by
example when it has the occasion to exercise its appointment
authority under Article 38. It could also take steps to demystify the
process through a conscious outreach effort outside of the
Washington, D.C.-London-Paris corridor. This may be
accompanied by efforts encouraging hearings to take place outside
of the traditional venues, preferably near or at the place where
most of the evidence is found. Relocating the hearing venue would
in turn encourage the involvement of traditionally under-
represented groups to be involved as arbitrators, counsel, and
expert witnesses.
Second, although much of the traditional literature addresses
the incoherence of the jurisprudence and debates the need for
appellate discipline, an important area that is often overlooked is
277 See supra Part 2 (discussing China's overtaking of the World Bank as the
largest source of financing in Africa).
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the allocation of cost. The allocation of cost appears to be a much
bigger problem than realized because it offers at least two wrong
incentives: (1) it fails to punish a party that brings forth non-
meritorious or marginally meritorious claims; and (2) it sustains
the arbitral process because the cost of proceedings is shared by
both parties even when no fault is found on the part of the
respondent state. Indeed, the allocation of cost almost always
operates to the disadvantage of the respondent state because the
private investor is almost always the party who initiates the
process. If the investor is not afraid of being penalized for bringing
a non-meritorious claim through the allocation of cost, it would
have fewer disincentives to try its chances. The state's costs are
likely to be higher in most instances because the respondent states
arbitrate cases in the investor's home state or at least continent and
therefore the state has to hire attorneys there in addition to paying
for transportation and accommodation of in-house counsel,
government officials, and covering expenses for fact and expert
witnesses as well as translation and interpretation services.
Although the private investor is also likely to bear similar costs, in
many cases, the opportunity cost might be lower. In any case,
unless somehow policed properly, the equal allocation of cost as a
default rule is likely to result in abuse of the system.278 As Figure 7
shows, in all cases where the host state won, it was required to
cover its own expenses and share the cost of the tribunal equally.
The wisdom of this approach is questionable.
The third issue that ICSID must address, which is also related
to the cost issue, is the liberal finding of jurisdiction. Apart from
the difficulty in the definition and use of summary judgment
standards, jurisdictional decisions also appear to suffer from
wrongful incentives. Appointment as an arbitrator in ICSID
proceedings is not only a prestigious honor, but also financially
rewarding, although perhaps less so than high-stake commercial
278 See, e.g., Susan D. Franck, Rationalizing Costs in Investment Treaty
Arbitration, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 769, 778 (2011) ("As international arbitration has
no equivalent to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 requiring good-faith
pleadings, the relationship has implications for using cost shifting in arbitration -
perhaps even in domestic litigation-to create incentives that promote efficient
and fair dispute resolution."). Summarizing her empirical study of costs in
investment arbitration cases, Professor Franck puts the problem mildly as "the
larger picture suggests that costs exhibited a degree of uncertainty." Id. at 778.
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arbitrations. 279 Persons who serve in this capacity are, in most
cases, of high moral and ethical character and are unlikely to be
influenced by the financial gains and added prestige that
accompany the appointment. However, there is a built-in
incentive for various stakeholders for the cases to continue beyond
the jurisdictional phase; such stakeholders include highly
compensated outside counsel representing respondent states and
in-house counsel and officials who get various travel and related
benefits when the case continues. Unfortunately, the jurisdictional
decisions are sometimes tied to the allocation of cost. In at least
one of the cases profiled above, the tribunal allocated cost equally
because the investor prevailed on the jurisdictional issue only. 280
Such being the reality of investment arbitration, ICSID must be
sensitive to jurisdictional decisions by tribunals operating under its
auspices. Although it does not have a direct supervisory role, it
could monitor the decisions, make them available to the extent
parties allow, attract and encourage commentary and academic
writing, and make statistics on jurisdictional decisions by specific
tribunals and arbitrators available in an intelligible manner.
Fourth and related to the above, ICISD must define and enforce
serious ethical and conflict standards. Although structurally it
does not have regulatory and supervisory jurisdiction on at least
party appointed arbitrators, it could use its good offices to
disseminate specific data on trends and track-records, invite and
encourage commentary on such issue, set-up and systematize
conflicts check processes, and make such data available for future
litigants. So much has been said about the need for ethical rules in
international arbitration,281 but it is perhaps more acutely
279 Under Regulation 14(1) of the most recent ICSID Administrative and
Financial Regulation, the current daily payment for meetings, hearings, and work
related to the case is $3000. Arbitrators are also eligible for additional per diems,
accommodation, travel, and other allowances. ICSID, Administrative and Financial
Regulations, Regulation 14(1): Direct Costs of Individual Proceedings, at 60, ICSID Doc.
ICSID/15/Rev.1 (Jan. 2003), compiled in ICSID CONVENTION, REGULATIONS AND
RULES, available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/part
C-chap03.htm.
2a See Franck, supra note 278, at 778 ("Tribunals were most likely to
rationalize their decisions using the parties' relative success and equitable
considerations.").
281 See, e.g., Catherine A. Rogers, Fit and Function in Legal Ethics: Developing a
Code of Conduct for International Arbitration, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 341 (2002)




important in investment arbitration involving economically
weaker states.
Finally and most importantly, ICSID must attempt to create a
generally welcoming and navigable environment for those who
have traditionally, implicitly considered it an imposition as a
condition of receiving foreign investment or even a condition of
doing business or receiving loans.
7. CONCLUSION
The statistical studies and the closer review of ICSID cases
involving African states do not necessarily reveal systematic and
glaring bias against or purposeful disadvantage to the positions of
African states. In fact, the outcome seems to be surprisingly
balanced and the jurisprudence profound. However, measuring
outcome neither explains nor justifies ICSID's diversity deficit and
related shortcomings. As this article demonstrated, a deeper
inquiry paints an unflattering picture on the reasons for the
African states' acceptance from the very beginning and their
experience in the last half-century: a history of benevolent
imposition and effective exclusion from meaningful decision
making. As the economic leverage increasingly shows diversity
and leans Eastwards, to stay relevant and useful, ICSID must take
a closer look at its half-century of arbitral justice and attempt to
remedy the perceived inequities. This article has attempted to
identify and characterize some of the glaring problems and offered
thoughts on how they might be addressed.
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642 U. Pa. J. Int'1 L. [Vol. 35:3
Ghana, Mensah Arbitrators:
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Mali Soci&t6 Yes Mali Mali had to
d'Exploitatio ordere pay all
n des Mines d to costs and
d'Or de refund expenses of







Morocc Paris Consortium No Split - Each Claimant's
667
668 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 35:3
o R.F.C.C. v. party to annulment
Kingdom of pay own arguments
Morocco, costs and rejected







































































Senegal Initially Socit6 Yes 150,000 Costs split -
the Ouest ,000 Award
Hague Africaine FCFA - breaks
(subseque des Btons - lost down
nt Industriels profits tribunal
hearings v. State of 552,989 costs
could Senegal, ,664
take place ICSID Case FCFA -
in Paris No. damag
or any ARB/82/1 es
other 255,937
place Investor ,342
upon Nationality: FCRA -
agreemen SOABI
t of incorporated Interest






Seychell Sydney CDC Grp. Yes £1,771, State to pay Application
es (Int.), plc v. 096.95 legal fees for
London Republic of plus 9 and annulment
(oral) Seychelles, % arbitration rejected










































































































Paris Biwater No. But No Split - Each
Gauff found damag party to
(Tanzania) that TZ es. pay own
Ltd. v. violated Declara costs and
United BIT tory half costs of

















































Togo Paris Togo Yes, some *10,623 Each party Togo had to
Electricit6 & of Togo ,742,58 to bear own pay costs: E
GDF-Suez Eleclectri- 2 CFA costs split 341.285,02
Energie city's francs cost of euros A
Servs. v. claims contrac tribunal as Togo
Republic of accepted tual follows 80% Electricit6 et
Togo, ICSID but other indem by E200.000
Case No. rejected. nities Respondent euros A




































































Zimbab Paris Bernardus Yes 13 Parties pay
we Henricus individ own costs
Funnekotter ual and
& Others v. claims Respondent
Republic of to pays fees of
2014] THE CHINA-AFRICA FACTOR 673
Zimbabwe, farms Tribunal /
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